Bugtraq mailing list archives
Fw: Bypassing Inherited Rights Filters in Novell Directory Services. (fwd)
From: William Diehl III <willdieh () LASIERRA EDU>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2000 11:20:32 -0700
Has this been verified by Foghornsecurity.com? When attempting to replicate the procedure as listed below, I was unable to repeat the security risk. As I understand it, IRFs and explicit rights access work PROPERLY and in the following fashion: - An IRF will filter INHERITED rights - An IRF will NOT filter any explicit rights to any objects AT OR BELOW the IRF level in the tree - Because the procedure below adds the "Write" right to the ACL of the OU ABOVE the IRF and sets it as INHERITABLE, it _will_ be blocked by the IRF because 1. it becomes an inherited right and 2. the explicit assignment is made above the IRF I am running Netware 5.0 service pack 5 with eDirectory (NDS 8). If this has indeed been verified and repeated by someone else, please let me know William Diehl Network Administrator LaSierra University Riverside, CA
---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2000 19:24:00 -0700 From: FogHorn Security <info () FOGHORNSECURITY COM> To: BUGTRAQ () SECURITYFOCUS COM Subject: Bypassing Inherited Rights Filters in Novell Directory Services. FOGHORN SECURITY ADVISORY issued September 7, 2000 http://www.foghornsecurity.com/advisories/20000907 Bypassing Inherited Rights Filters in Novell Directory Services. SUMMARY A design weakness in NDS as shipped with Novell v5.0 and later can allow certain users to bypass IRF's, and gain escalation of
privileges.
SEVERITY Serious. Even in a well designed tree IRF's are sometimes needed to
protect
more sensitive objects. This issue, if not carefully considered, can
easily
render IRF's ineffective, and expose sensitive information. BACKGROUND In NDS, rights are assigned in three ways: Rights to an object [Object Rights] Rights to all properties of an object [All Properties Rights] Rights to selected properties of an object [Selected Properties Rights] By default, rights granted at one level of a directory tree automatically flow down to lower levels in the tree. This inheritance of rights can be blocked by using Inherited Rights Filters [IRFs]. IRFs can be set for any of the three types of rights mentioned above. THE PROBLEM In previous versions of NDS, only Object Rights, and All Properties Rights could be inherited. In Netware 5.0, Novell added the ability to make Selected Property Rights inheritable. These rights are not blocked by IRFs set for Object Rights or All Properties Rights. They can only be blocked by the creation of an explicit IRF for each property you need to protect. Obviously, this is unworkable in the real world. Setting individual IRFs for every property in the schema is tedious and prone to error, and it is extremely difficult to anticipate all possible exploits for all
properties.
Additionally, if the schema is extended, the new properties would be unprotected until IRFs were updated. This also presents a problem for sites upgrading from Novell 4.11. If
this
issue is not addressed in the upgrade process, IRF's which were previously valid, could be rendered ineffective. EXPLOIT Active exploitation of this feature requires Write rights to the Object Trustees ACL property of a container at or above the level of the object
being
attacked. Here's an example. An administrator, .BOB.ACME, has Supervisor [S] rights
to
the .ACME container. There is a container, .SECRET.ACME, which BOB should
not
have any access to. Joe, .JOE.SECRET.ACME, is the administrator of .SECRET.ACME. Joe has been given S rights to SECRET, and an IRF has been put in place on SECRET blocking all Object Rights, and all All Properties Rights. This scenario
is in
line with standard practice, and Novell's own documentation [See TID#
10011973]
Unfortunately, Bob can still gain full control of secret. 1] Bob modifies the trustees list of .ACME granting himself the Write [W] right to the Object Trustees ACL property and designates this right as inheritable. 2] Since Selected Properties Rights are not explictly blocked by the IRF at .SECRET.ACME, Bob can now add himself to the trustee list of the SECRET container and obtain full privileges. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS In addition to active exploits, this issue could result in administrators inadvertently granting rights to objects they believe to be protected by
IRF's.
For instance, Help Desk staff may be granted password reset rights by
granting
Selected Properties Rights at a high level in the tree, and making those
rights
inheritable. Those rights can only be blocked with an explicit Selected Properties IRF at the containers or objects you need protected. WORKAROUND It is impossible to anticipate all the scenarios where this *feature* could be exploited. Administrators should carefully evaluate their tree and permission structures with this problem in mind. At a minimum, where IRFs are used to protect objects or containers, the following properties should be protected by explicit IRFs: Object Trustees [ACL] Members Security Equal to Me Password Required Password Management Incorrect Login Attempts There are certainly others that would need to be protected as well. Finding additional exploits is left as an exercise for the reader. [Hint: Audit Objects] FIX We believe that Novell should either, a) Make IRFs set for All Properties Rights apply to Selected Properties Rights as well or b) Provide a method whereby all Selected Properties Rights could be filtered with a single IRF. COMMENTS This is a classic example of adding functionality without fully
considering the
implications. While we do not consider this to be a *bug*, it is clearly
a
poorly designed *feature*. We could not find any reference to this on
Novell's
support website. In fact, as referenced above, Novell's own documentation [TID# 10011973 - last updated on June 29, 2000] does not address this
issue.
In that document, they answer the question, "How do I create an admin for
a
container that cuts off the main admin?" They do not specify the
filtering of
Selected Properties Rights, and thus leave readers open to this
vulnerability.
Safe Computing, -FogHorn Security Staff
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- Fw: Bypassing Inherited Rights Filters in Novell Directory Services. (fwd) William Diehl III (Sep 08)