Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u)
From: casper () HOLLAND SUN COM (Casper Dik)
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 1999 21:55:39 +0100
Perhaps the Sun kernel developers aren't aware that it's bad to allow tracing after a program changes uid, but obviously they are aware that it's bad to allow tracing of an unreadable program. In fact, the /proc documentation identifies this as a security measure.
This has long been fixed in Solaris. (I think it was fixed before 2.6 was released; there's a patch for Solaris 2.5.1 also) Since the patch, programs that are set-uid, call set*uid or set*gid cannot be traced and cannot dump core. (Which upset yet another batch of customers so there's an option in Solaris 7 to make set-uid programs dump core if the kernel is so configured) (Oh, and Dan Bernstein wins the useless use of lseek award; dd can seek fine) Casper
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- Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u) D. J. Bernstein (Jan 12)
- Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u) Wietse Venema (Jan 13)
- Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u) Casper Dik (Jan 13)
- Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u) James Mathiesen (Jan 15)
- Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u) Gene Spafford (Jan 13)
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