Bugtraq mailing list archives

Re: Exploit for Linux wu.ftpd hole


From: medulla () infosoc com (Mike Edulla)
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 1995 14:19:31 -0400


On Wed, 5 Jul 1995, Larry Kruper wrote:

Date: Wed, 5 Jul 1995 19:40:51 -0700
From: Larry Kruper <lak () home crimelab com>
To: Multiple recipients of list BUGTRAQ <BUGTRAQ () CRIMELAB COM>
Subject: Re: Exploit for Linux wu.ftpd hole

On Wed, 5 Jul 1995, Henri Karrenbeld wrote:

Date: Wed, 5 Jul 1995 18:44:17 +0100
From: Henri Karrenbeld <H.Karrenbeld () ct utwente nl>
To: Multiple recipients of list BUGTRAQ <BUGTRAQ () CRIMELAB COM>
Subject: Exploit for Linux wu.ftpd hole

minicom has a known, but not very well-known hole in it that is nearly
identical to the wu-ftp hole. If you are a legitimate user of a pre 1.71
version of minicom, you can get root, its the same sort of thing,
seteuid(0), and then make a suid root shell somewhere - you do it by
changing the name of 'runscript' to your shell...

It wouldnt really be much of a problem, except that linux to this day (i
believe) continues to have the users gonzo, satan, and snake in
minicom.users (or the slackware release does, at the very least).
---

So, how is this bug exploited if gonzo, satan or snake are not in /etc/passwd ?
With the minicom F - username (i.e. satan) I do not get an error for not
being in the minicom.users file, but J does not jump to a shell. How is this
done ?

I am doing this on my own system, not someone elses.


Indeed, this offers some protection - it's nonetheless a serious bug.
Anyone who has, or can get access to minicom via minicom.users can get root.

Also, under the default config on 1.70, {metakey}J doesnt jump to a
shell, it suspends the program.

Thats why the intruder must edit the apth to runscript instead (runscript
is the script interpreter, and its path can be edited in the
configuration area).



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