Security Basics mailing list archives
Re: When an incident has really happened.
From: Aarón Mizrachi <unmanarc () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 13:39:05 -0430
On Martes 19 Mayo 2009 07:31:18 Curt Shaffer escribió:
I just wanted to post this as a question to those on this list. I had a discussion with a security admin the other day. They wanted me to take a look at their incident handling document. This document outlined the steps that they would take in the case of an incident. Now don't get me wrong, the document was spot on I believe. It was well written and you can tell a proper balance of technical and informational data was put together. What this did bring up in my mind is; When has an incident, specifically a compromise, happened that a process like this needs to be put into action? I realize there is a balance that needs to happen because if we did this same routine for every system infected with a virus, management would probably start to not trust things are going well (little boy crying wolf). What about a bot though? Long story short, as we all know, bots are used to control systems. The problem that I see is that a lot of companies downplay the significance of a bot, even some IPS systems I have put in place call them low threats! Just because at this time that bot is only popping up ads on your PC doesn't mean the attacker has any less than full control of your system. In my mind, a party outside of your network, often unknown to you, has full control of one of your systems. That sounds like a compromise or incident to me. It only takes one update from the bot's command and control center to turn it into something much more horrifying.
I completly agree with you. In malware terms, a program who are designed to show you popups are called adware. But, is on familiy of malware, could also have some "uploader" engine who magnify their behavior to spyware, or even a controled trojan.
Now there are controls in place like IDS and IPS systems which can often block and alert of the existence of such a software. This is a good thing. The question is though, should this be treated like an incident of compromise or should it be quietly removed and cleaned up because it was caught so early? I guess a third option would be to have a non management alerted incident handling process in place as well. Not that we want to cover these tracks, but for the security admin to keep track of but possibly release at some quarterly meeting saying "we had x many major incidents and y many minor incidents". It's an interesting thought to find that balance. I would love to hear some opinions.
well, you are also right with the third option, but. i think every threat must be followed and reported in a detailed document, sometimes, the bad hacker will cover up their traces using programs like this... who are meant to be a "low level malware". But what if this program are a part of a big picture? I think that should be followed and reported. Probably is not necessary track this incident with the same effort of a major incident, but, what to do? The document should have their threat level scale. Having this, all threats must be followed and traced, and the next to do is have a scope level by threat level. Threat level could have more scales than "major and minor", remember the big picture. Scenario: Suppose that today you receive an scanning, then, a hacker known that you are using something like "cisco vpn etc...", the hacker try to get access, but, today are he didnt get access. A few months later, an attacker found a new exploit for this "cisco vpn", then, if you missed the past event, you wont be prepared for this. A low threat level could be a prelude for a big event, and if you are good enough to identify preludes, you are prepared to handle and stop comming up big events. Conclusion: all events must be reported, you need to have an threat scale on documents, and... get infected with a malware or a virus are also matter of security administration, if you get infected, you have some security leak that must also be exploited by some hacker. Not only adwares.... We are commonly scaling the threat by their impact... missing the vuln used by this malware to get inside you. If we focus on cover vulns also, we can protect ourselves for future more malicious attacks. Remember that an IDS or IPS or AV detect this threat because this malware have a signature. When not, you wont be able to handle it with the ids, ips or antivirus. But if you protect the vulns, you will be more secure.
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Current thread:
- When an incident has really happened. Curt Shaffer (May 19)
- Re: When an incident has really happened. Aarón Mizrachi (May 19)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: When an incident has really happened. aaa (May 20)