Security Basics mailing list archives
RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption
From: "Craig Wright" <cwright () bdosyd com au>
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 07:36:16 +1100
Fairly much. There are hash based signature schemes for example, but having ones that may not be repudiated are difficult. Also comes to good practice. Why sign a message if it may be repudiated later (though there may be some reasons)? Craig -----Original Message----- From: Gregory Rubin [mailto:grrubin () gmail com] Sent: 25 March 2006 7:15 To: Craig Wright Cc: gillettdavid () fhda edu; shyaam () gmail com; security-basics () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption So it sounds to me that this is more a legal and contractual issue than a technical issue, or am I misreading this? Greg Rubin On 3/22/06, Craig Wright <cwright () bdosyd com au> wrote:
Hi David, Non-repudiation has different requirements in different legal jurisdictions. There needs to be a manner to verify the keys (i.e. PKI). I can get a verisign certificate calling myself Bill Gates. This does not mean for
the purpose of legal contractual negotiations that I am Bill Gates. I could sign an email as such though. For non-repudiation to work, there needs to be an attestation by the operator of the certificate authority. The following are some guidelines for non-repudiation, based on locality of course: Australia National Electronic Authentication Council, Liability and other Legal Issues in the Use of PKI Digital Certificates (May 2002). EC, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Austria, Signature Law, 2000 England, Scotland and Wales Electronic Communications Act, 2000 Germany Signature Law, 2001 Sweden Qualified Electronic Signatures Act (SFS 2000:832) (in swedish). India Information Technology Act, 2000 New Zealand Electronic Transactions Act, 2003 sections 22-24 USA Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN), at 15 U.S.C. 7001 et seq Switzerland Federal Law on Certification Services Concerning the Electronic Signature, 2003 To take a quote from the English Ministry associated with Digital Signature law: "A private key authenticated by a digital certificate generated within
a PKI can be considered as the electronic equivalent of a passport. Both establish identities for persons who have met the requisite identity checks. The community accepts the validity of the holder's identity because it trusts the issuer. The identity can be used to authenticate the holder in subsequent transactions without directly involving the issuer." Web of trust models such as PGP can result in a signature, but the issue of non-repudiation is not fulfilled in that the issuer can not be held to account separately (as it is a self signed certificate). In situations where the parties have had prior dealings, it may be possible to verify the owner of the public key, for example, at a personal meeting, parties may exchange public keys on floppy disks (eg
key signing parties). However, if the parties are unknown to each other, and perhaps in different jurisdictions, the requisite level of confidence is not present. The solution to this lies in the public key
infrastructure and is governed by different levels of trust. Regards Craig -----Original Message----- From: David Gillett [mailto:gillettdavid () fhda edu] Sent: 23 March 2006 8:24 To: Craig Wright; shyaam () gmail com; security-basics () securityfocus com Subject: RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Does non-repudiation require anything more than assurance that the private key (a) MUST have been used, and (b) HASN'T been compromised? Are you just alluding to the measures which support those assertions, or to some additional requirement(s) that escapes me? [If your private key isn't really private, all bets are off.] David Gillett-----Original Message----- From: Craig Wright [mailto:cwright () bdosyd com au] Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 12:56 PM To: gillettdavid () fhda edu; shyaam () gmail com; security-basics () securityfocus com Subject: RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption True, but the argument was not one as to which is the better method. There are several secure hashing algorithms. Further there is more to verification to source than just asymmetric
keys. Non-repudiation is a complex field in itself and requires a entire range of associated infrastructure. Regards CraigLiability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards
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Current thread:
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption, (continued)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Craig Wright (Mar 22)
- Re: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Gregory Rubin (Mar 22)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption John Lightfoot (Mar 24)
- Re: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Greg Rubin (Mar 24)
- Re: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Gregory Rubin (Mar 22)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption David Gillett (Mar 22)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Craig Wright (Mar 22)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Craig Wright (Mar 24)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption David Gillett (Mar 24)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Craig Wright (Mar 24)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption David Gillett (Mar 24)
- Re: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Gregory Rubin (Mar 27)
- RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption Craig Wright (Mar 28)