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RE: User verification questions
From: "Derick Anderson" <danderson () vikus com>
Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2005 13:01:12 -0400
The problem I have with users creating their own questions is that they aren't concerned with the security of their question. Perhaps if they were required to remember the question as well... but if they can remember a question and answer they probably won't forget their password. Asking for usernames and passwords over the phone seems a little like reverse social engineering, although I suppose since they are the ones calling us the danger is minimal at worst. As for lockouts and encryption I think that is good practice in general which I have been pushing where I work. We collect SSNs because it is a job application. The risks of providing one online are similar to those of providing one on paper. Whether it is good practice for us as a third party to have access to those SSNs is another story. Derick Anderson
-----Original Message----- From: Auri Rahimzadeh [mailto:Auri () auri net] Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 12:18 PM To: webappsec () securityfocus com; Derick Anderson Subject: RE: User verification questions While not a be-all-end-all approach, I've implemented the following on a few sites: * Let the user create their own question/answer. * Do not email usernames and passwords - require the user to call and verify information (with no disclosure or hints). * Lock out invalid login attempts for minutes at a time to prevent brute force attacks. * Encrypt all the personal+confidential data in the database and encrypt+hide the keys. I question why you'd collect SSNs BEFORE an applicant has been hired. It seems unnecessary and dangerous to store along with so much other personal information. Best, Auri Rahimzadeh Author, Geek My Ride Author, Hacking the PSP Co-Author, Hacking Digital Cameras ---------- Original Message ---------------------------------- From: "Derick Anderson" <danderson () vikus com> Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2005 12:00:47 -0400Andrew, Thanks for the response. My company's particular situation is this: We offer a web-based HR job application for our clients, so we never actually see them. Because of this we actually do collectsome senstiveinformation as required by the job application such as SSNor driver'slicense if applicable. We also store the applicant data andprovide aweb-based console for the respective client HR organizations. The problem, as usual, is human-based. Management tells me (I am the sys admin) that some of our applicants are extremely computer-illiterate and email is way beyond them (how they manage the online application but can't fathom email is beyond me...). So my suggestion ofrequiringemail was turned down. Primarily I am looking at password recovery, but alsoverification forour corporate clients who often request changes only we can make. In such a case passwords are not the issue, it's simply userverification.I think your first suggestion (random numbers on the screen)will workfor us but we still need something more complete. I'm beginning to think that requiring email is the only good solution but I'm pretty sure that I'll get outvoted on that again. Thanks again, Derick Anderson-----Original Message----- From: Andrew van der Stock [mailto:vanderaj () greebo net] Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 3:33 AM To: Derick Anderson Cc: webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: Re: User verification questions The quick answer is "none of the above". I regularly answer random characters to them as I refuse to use them. My litany of inexcusable design frights against these awful interfaces are: a) Privacy acts. You have to have a decent reason tocollect and keepprivate information. These q&a monstrosities do not qualify. Businesses have NO reason to know my mother's maiden name. They have NO reason to know my favorite pet's name. Therefore, legally, you may not collect this information from me under most privacy regimes. b) Public sources. Most of the typical questions can bederived frompublic sources (date of birth, license numbers, credit checks, etc) c) Laws and regulations surrounding certain types of information, particularly government identifiers. You must not collect or use certain pieces of information, such as SSN or similar government identifiers. d) "Guess an identity". Most people's favorite color isblue (about90% from my survey so far). Similar guess-able answers canbe used toget past help desks with many clerks as they do not keep atrack ofthe total number of failed accesses through this back doorpasswordscheme. e) Information Security Policy adherence. These systems are a weak backdoor password system. Five question Q&A are theequivalent of twocharacter passwords in terms of entropy (at best) and do not have any password aging, generally do nothave anybrute force provisions (although I don't like account lockout measures either), and thus fail to meet even basic security least common denominator practice. f) It's one factor security - "something you know". I'd have an excellent chance at answering any of my family's Q&A's,and a fairlygood chance at any of my best friend's Q&A's. Imagine if this was for a joint bank account where the two parties are feuding - you've just given access to someone who hasno right tothe account. Lastly, there are usually much better ways to go aboutthese schemesthan questions and answers. a) if it's to identify someone to a help desk, use arandom number onthe screen: ++++++++++++ | Please call 1 800 LUSER, and quote "43743". b) if it's to recover access to an account, even e-mail orSMS resetsare stronger than this - they are almost a "something you have, something you know". If you value your accounts, nothingbeats faceto face contact. Evidence of identity is essential fortrust in theaccount. thanks, Andrew On 11/10/2005, at 12:47 AM, Derick Anderson wrote:What good questions can be used for user verification? I'veseen somepassword recovery interfaces which have the typicalmother's maidenname, city of birth, etc. and others which let the user define their own question (a stupid idea in my opinion, but I'mwilling tobe educated). I'm thinking beyond a password recovery interface - I'mmore concernedwith a general protocol that could be used in situations where email isn't an option. Thanks, Derick Anderson
Current thread:
- User verification questions Derick Anderson (Oct 11)
- Re: User verification questions Andrew van der Stock (Oct 11)
- Re: User verification questions Mark Jeftovic (Oct 11)
- Re: User verification questions Yousef Syed (Oct 13)
- Re: User verification questions John Manko (Oct 11)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: User verification questions Derick Anderson (Oct 11)
- RE: User verification questions Auri Rahimzadeh (Oct 11)
- RE: User verification questions Derick Anderson (Oct 11)
- Re: User verification questions bryan allott (Oct 12)
- RE: User verification questions Auri Rahimzadeh (Oct 12)
- Re: User verification questions bryan allott (Oct 12)
- RE: User verification questions Auri Rahimzadeh (Oct 11)
- RE: User verification questions Derick Anderson (Oct 12)
- Re: User verification questions Gary Gwin (Oct 13)
- Re: User verification questions Andrew van der Stock (Oct 11)