Re: one use for taxonomies

[Andrew van der Stock <vanderaj () greebo net>]

Brenda,

I use TM to decompose business risks as a guide to look for technical  
issues. If there's a technical threat model, it's usually hard to see  
the bigger picture of what actually matters.

The reason I do this is to prioritize the search for business- 
interesting issues, rather than discovering a raft of lesser risks  
which have no business risk. For example, the world is not going to  
end if I order a book from Amazon without "128 bit SSL" protecting  
me. Sure it may be slightly riskier, but one transaction is not going  
to cause Amazon to disappear. However, if you can discover a way to  
view all reports on a system, this is terribly embarrassing for the  
organization and may violate privacy laws (and banking regulations if  
you're a bank).

This implies we need several kingdoms, and some kingdoms are more  
important than others.

Technical Kingdom
- Authentication
- Event handling
- Injection
- Cryptography
- etc

Business Kingdom
- Reputation
- Intellectual Property Loss
- Monetary Loss
- etc

User Kingdom
- Privacy violation
- Identity Theft
- Monetary Loss
- Trust
- etc

Straw-man:

Technical Kingdom view
1.0 An attacker may be able to see the contents of a transaction
1.1 An attacker has control of a network device involved in the  
transaction flow
1.1.1 The attacker can see all data
1.2 An attacker has a MITM proxy installed on the client PC
1.2.1 The attacker can see plain text transactions

Business Kingdom view
1.0 An attacker may be able to change the value of a transaction
...

User Kingdom view
1.0 An attacker may be able to steal my credit card when I use this  
service
...

I personally don't think this is tractable problem for automation  
except as a subset of a particular kingdom. What we need are better  
threat modeling tools to assist in the creation of threat models. The  
MS tool is far too cumbersome to use for first time modelers. I use  
tables in Word and graphs in Visio if I have to do presentations.

thanks,
Andrew


On 15/07/2005, at 8:07 AM, Brenda wrote:

> I'm one of the "folks in Seattle" Arian mentioned in a previous post.
> I have read what seemed relevant in the list archives, but I just got
> here; I apologize if I am restating points others said previously.
>
> Some colleagues & I have been working on a more consistent,
> reproducible, computable &c threat modeling methodology.  If you've