RE: Custom session tokens and XSS

[Dean Saxe <Dean.Saxe () magnetbanking com>]

Why couldn't this be used for XSS?  If the form field name is constant it
would be trivial to write JavaScript to loop through the available forms on
a page, find the token and forward it to an attacker.  The attacker than
then use the token for authentication and, theoretically, will be allowed in
the application.

Unless I'm missing something here, this is ripe for exploitation unless the
data is sanitized before being returned to the browser.

-dhs

-----Original Message-----
From: PortSwigger [mailto:mail () portswigger net]
Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2003 4:30 PM
To: webappsec () securityfocus com
Subject: Custom session tokens and XSS


I have recently looked at a web application which maintains session state 
using a custom token stored in a hidden form field. Each page within the 
application is accessed using a POST request which includes the token.

Several locations within the authenticated areas of the application
exhibited 
XSS-like behaviour (i.e. client data submitted in form and URL querystring 
fields is returned unsanitised to the browser). However (as far as I could 
see) there was no way to exploit this to attack other users. Any request not

containing a valid session token results in a redirect to the login page.
And 
so assuming that only the user knows their own session token, only they
could 
frame a malicious request that would succeed in injecting arbitrary 
HTML/JavaScript into their browser.

The relevant difference from conventional session tokens (cookies) is that
the 
custom token is not automatically stored and resubmitted by the browser as 
the user moves between pages. Rather, the browser only submits the token
with 
any given request because the application has set the token within the form 
that generates that request. If the user initiates an arbitrary request 
(induced by an attacker) then it will not contain a valid token, and they
are 
returned to the login page.

Although the developers had chosen this means of maintaining session state
for 
different reasons (to do with load-balancing across multiple web servers),
it 
effectively reduces both the scope and impact of any XSS vulnerabilities:

1. Users can only be attacked using XSS vulnerabilities which appear within 
the unauthenticated area of the app, where a valid session token isn't 
required. If this area consists of a single login page, the task of 
addressing XSS problems is considerably reduced.

2. Attacking a logged-in user using any XSS vulnerabilities within the 
unauthenticated area of the app could not straightforwardly be used to 
capture their session token. Although the token is cached in the browser 
request history, it is not stored in 'document.cookie', nor could it be 
obtained using an XST-style trick. (Of course, there is plenty an attacker 
can do with XSS other than cookie-stealing, but this does prevent one of the

easier attacks.)

Of course, there may be downsides to this approach to session management,
and 
I wouldn't recommend it without question, but I think it's worthy of 
consideration.

Any thoughts?

PortSwigger