Vulnerability Development mailing list archives
Re: ssh
From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf () coredump cx>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2002 15:49:54 -0500 (EST)
On Thu, 7 Feb 2002, Olaf Kirch wrote:
I understand the maths behind this, but I can't quite see a practical attack. If the attacker wants to guess a plaintext block P_i transmitted by the SSH client, he must feed his plaintext block P_(i+1) to the ssh client on standard input, so that it is properly encrypted and then transmitted. This implies a great deal of control over the client process (such as the ability to write to the client's standard input).
Well, in some cases, this might be possible. For example, when some protocol is tunneled over ssh - irc, smtp, pop3, and so on, and so on. Pretty common application. In many cases, a block of at least partially sensitive information (private messages, mails, etc) can be followed by attacker-induced block (irc ping responses, smtp return envelope, whatever). Of course, this usually does not apply to any interactive sessions - some might argue that users are often predictable, e.g. always type 'ls' after logging in, but...
I don't say it's not a problem, but I think this is exagerating things a bit.
That's a different thing ;-) -- _____________________________________________________ Michal Zalewski [lcamtuf () bos bindview com] [security] [http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx] <=-=> bash$ :(){ :|:&};: =-=> Did you know that clones never use mirrors? <=-= http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/photo/
Current thread:
- ssh -l0rt- (Feb 06)
- Re: ssh Jose Nazario (Feb 06)
- Re: ssh -l0rt- (Feb 06)
- Re: ssh Jose Nazario (Feb 06)
- Re: ssh Jose Nazario (Feb 06)
- Re: ssh Olaf Kirch (Feb 07)
- Re: ssh Jose Nazario (Feb 07)
- Re: ssh Michal Zalewski (Feb 07)
- HTTP 1.1 TRACE Command Clinton Smith (Feb 07)
- Re: HTTP 1.1 TRACE Command Clinton Smith (Feb 08)
- Re: ssh -l0rt- (Feb 06)
- Re: ssh Jose Nazario (Feb 06)