RE: Secure Yahoo logins

["Kayne Ian (Softlab)" <Ian.Kayne () softlab co uk>]

->

> segment) or some sort of DNS diversion which would probably 
> require you to have control of the necessary DNS servers.  At that 

DNS Cache poisoning is probably the easiest way of doing that to unsecured
DNS servers.

Ian Kayne
Technical Specialist - IT Solutions
Softlab Ltd - A BMW Company


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Steve Bremer [mailto:steveb () nebcoinc com]
> Sent: 28 August 2002 17:34
> To: nick () ethicsdesign com
> Cc: vuln-dev () securityfocus com
> Subject: Re: Secure Yahoo logins
>
>
>
> If you can perform a mitm attack, there is no doubt you can read the 
> traffic since you'll actually be decrypting it.  However, 
> performing the 
> mitm attack is the problem here.  With the exception of the recent 
> browser flaws, it's not necessarily an easy attack.
>
> You would have to find a way to get their browser to go to your 
> machine in the first place.  This would require some sort of ARP 
> spoofing (in which case you would need to be on their local network 
> segment) or some sort of DNS diversion which would probably 
> require you to have control of the necessary DNS servers.  At that 
> point, you'd also have to deal with the warning the user would 
> receive about an unsigned certificate being used (although this may 
> not be difficult since many people click through the warnings).
>
> There may be other (easier) methods as well, but I'm not aware of 
> them.
>
> Please enlighten me if I'm wrong.
>
> Steve
>
> On 28 Aug 2002 at 1:36, Nick Jacobsen wrote:
>
> > I just love this...  You are telling me that I can't sniff 
> information
> > from an SSL session using a mitm attack?  the whole point 
> is that you
> > are in the middle...  i.e. client connects to you and you coneect to
> > server, therefore the SSL session with the server is between you and
> > the server, not the client and the server...  you simply pass
> > everything on to the client as well, acting as the remote server... 
> > Try using ettercap, then tell me I am wrong...
> >
> >
> > Nick J.
> > Ethics Design
> > nick () ethicsdesign com
> > ethics () netzero net
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "David Thiel" <lx () redundancy redundancy org>
> > To: "Nick Jacobsen" <nick () ethicsdesign com>
> > Cc: <vuln-dev () securityfocus com>
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2002 9:06 PM
> > Subject: Re: Secure Yahoo logins
> >
> >
> > > On Tue, Aug 27, 2002 at 08:36:40PM -0700, Nick Jacobsen wrote:
> > > > it supports SSH(Secure Telnet)
> > >
> > > SSH is not even remotely like "Secure Telnet".
> > >
> > > > and SSL(HTTPS) decryption and sniffing, as
> > >
> > > Only if you have the server's keypair.
> > >
> > > > I guess my main point is that if you are having your 
> users log in
> > > > using "secure log in" for the express reason of making 
> it so their
> > > > password
> > cannot
> > > > be sniffed, it is pointless, as anyone can STILL sniff it!
> > >
> > > There's a higher difficulty level involved with MITM attacks, and
> > > measures can be taken to prevent and/or recognize such 
> attacks. SSL
> > > is not a panacea, but it's a useful layer of security.  The fact
> > > that MITM attacks exist is not proper rationale for abandoning the
> > > use of encryption.


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