FC: Photos, text of top Euro antitrustocrat's speech yesterday

[Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>]

Photos from event:
http://www.mccullagh.org/theme/lowe-aai-antitrust-july02.html

News.com article:
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-941090.html?tag=fd_top

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http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/192.cfm
   
                 "Competition Policy in the European Union"
                                Philip Lowe
                 American Antitrust Institute, 1 July 2002
                                      
   I. Introduction
   
   Ladies and gentlemen,
   
   It is my pleasure to address this distinguished audience today on
   behalf of Commissioner Mario Monti on the subject of Competition
   Policy in the European Union. The subject is a broad one and having
   not yet officially taken over from Alex Schaub as Director General, I
   am not going to throw caution and job security completely to the winds
   by attempting to define or redefine the policy over this lunch!
   However, I would like to give you a feel for some of the key issues
   facing us over the coming months. As you may know, competition policy
   in the EU goes beyond the disciplines that are familiar to you here in
   the United States, that is, merger scrutiny and anti-trust
   enforcement. It also addresses the behaviour of governments through
   our rules on state aid, services of general economic interest and
   liberalisation.
   
   The principles underlying the three strands of EU competition policy -
   mergers, anti-trust and state aid - are constant.
   
   First, enforcement action aims at protecting competition. This
   fundamental goal is enshrined in the Treaties establishing the
   European Union, namely that we aim for "a system ensuring that
   competition in the Internal Market is not distorted". The interest of
   consumers in the broad sense - individuals and businesses - is the
   primary concern. The concerns of competitors are relevant to the
   extent, and only to the extent, that they provide evidence of actual
   or potential harm to competition and consumer interests.
   
   Secondly, our assessment of a merger, an agreement or a grant of aid
   has to be based on sound economic analysis, not legal formalism. Law
   and economics are necessary companions in our day-to-day work. After
   all, competition law gives legal form to economic concepts. Striving
   to find the right balance between legal certainty and economic
   accuracy is the hallmark of any successful competition system. This
   challenge is a never-ending one. Not only because economists'
   positions on important points of principle have been known to change -
   as the evolution in US anti-trust enforcement also demonstrates. But
   also because the application of competition policy to any given
   situation depends on the particularities of the market in question. It
   is precisely this scope for policy evolution and the need to take
   account of market realities - and indeed likely realities in the
   future - that makes our work both challenging and stimulating. To get
   competition policy right, we need to be rigorous in our fact-finding,
   transparent and fair in our assessment and effective in our
   enforcement. Fortunately, given the visibility of our intervention in
   business life, there is no lack of comment and appraisal of our
   performance - as well as suggestions for change from all sides,
   whether we get it right or wrong!
   
   Our third guiding principle is more specific to the European Union. In
   the particular constitutional set-up of the European Union, an
   efficient division of work between the European level - the Commission
   - and the enforcement agencies in the Member States is essential. Up
   to now, EU anti-trust law has been established alongside national laws
   and it has been primarily the Commission's task to ensure business
   agreements are not anti-competitive, on the basis of a notification
   system. In an Internal Market of more than 380 million people, with
   the imminent prospect of enlargement to more than 450 million, this
   way or working is no longer practical or effective.
   
   That's why we are moving towards a new framework in which EU antitrust
   law can be enforced directly by the competition authority or court
   which is best placed to do it at the regional, national or EU level.
   
   The Commission must concentrate on really serious breaches of the
   competition rules that affect the EU Internal Market as a whole. This
   means in most cases that it should be dealing with the effects of
   agreements or practices on competition which go beyond the territory
   of any one Member State. Enforcement procedures must also be efficient
   and coherent throughout the European Union with an acceptable level of
   legal certainty for business.
   
   In fact, many of the issues facing us within the EU in terms of
   multiple jurisdiction are of particular relevance to on-going efforts
   to find solutions at the multilateral level to competition concerns.
   EU and US co-operation in this regard has, and will continue, to be
   crucial. More widely, the initiatives now being taken, for example in
   the International Competition Network, within OECD and in the Doha
   Development Round only serve to strengthen the growing and much needed
   convergence in the application of our respective multi-trust policies.
   The EU for its part is not only an active participant in networks of
   international competition authorities. The enlargement of the EU in
   2004 brings with it a further countries who have agreed to introduce
   competition laws and to accept EU competition law.
   
   For the EU and the US, active anti trust enforcement is an essential
   component of the good governance of a market-led economy. Similarly,
   the open and constructive acceptance of and cooperation in antitrust
   enforcement is an essential component of corporate governance. This is
   surely an area where the EU and the US in particular can show
   developing countries how the market can be effectively policed to
   promote a better deal for consumers and to avoid excess and abuse.
   
   I am not going to try to spoil your lunch with a litany of all
   outstanding issues in EU competition policy. I want to concentrate on
   three areas which are high up on our competition agenda, all of which
   have relevance for US antitrust authorities and for US firms.
   
   First, a few words about the critical and complementary role in EU
   competition policy which is played by control of aids provided by
   national governments. I will then address some of the most important
   challenges in our review EU merger law and practice and our wider
   reform of anti-trust enforcement.
   
   EU Competition policy - beyond mergers and anti-trust
   
   While EU antitrust rules address the behaviour of undertakings in ways
   that are familiar to you - cartels, abuses of dominant positions - the
   State aid rules focus on measures implemented by government. These two
   sets of rules are complementary in application and coherent with
   respect to their goal: that competition in the internal market is not
   distorted.
   
   This combined scrutiny of the decisions of both corporations and
   States is unique to the EU vision of competition policy. It is based
   on the logic that efforts under the anti-trust rules to ensure that
   companies do not distort competition and trade within the Union would
   be to little avail if Member States were allowed to seek to outbid
   each other in offering subsidies to save firms in economic
   difficulties, or to attract investment, with negative consequences for
   the European Union as a whole.
   
   Today, the control of state aids has proven to be a source of real
   strength for the European Union. First of all the risk of market
   distortions from state aids is even stronger today than it was in the
   past. As the European Internal Market has become a reality, a number
   of governmental trade barriers have been eliminated. This means that
   the more usual forms of protection of national markets and players by
   Member States are disappearing. If not properly controlled, state aid
   can often have the effect of maintaining the barriers to trade that we
   have tried to dismantle. State aids rules also allow us to address
   behaviour by States - often acting through the intermediary of
   publicly-owned companies - that directly affects competition in
   important markets.
   
   One might of course, at least in theory, advocate a simple ban on
   State aid, in the interests of achieving maximum competition. However,
   this would neither be realistic or desirable: there are valid and
   legitimate reasons for governments to grant aid to companies, such as
   favouring regions particularly disadvantaged or suffering from low
   employment. Even in the US, government - at the local, state and
   federal levels - intervenes with subsidy measures, whether through the
   Small Business Administration, or via regional incentives, or again in
   favour of airlines in response to the events of 11 September.
   
   The EC system provides a legal framework that allows for the
   anti-competitive effects of such measures to be independently assessed
   against clear criteria. In fact, our state aids discipline accounts
   for around half of the Commission's competition enforcement activity.
   There is no other jurisdiction where an independent authority is
   granted such strong powers to challenge decisions adopted by sovereign
   States in an area as politically sensitive as the grant of aid to
   particular companies.
   
   Nor is there any other jurisdiction in which an enforcement agency can
   steer a process of economic liberalisation. Article 86 of the EC
   Treaty gives the Commission precisely those enforcement powers. And
   they have been used for example to good effect in combination with
   regulatory legislation in the telecommunications sector. In this
   context, the judgements handed down by the highest EU court in June of
   this year concerning the compatibility with EU law on free movement of
   capital of governments maintaining control mechanisms - so-called
   "golden shares" - in privatised companies deserve a mention as their
   implications are far-reaching. Article 86 also provides the basis for
   more timely intervention in order to ensure that national "services of
   general economic interest" - to use some EU speak for services that
   must be broadly available - really do operate for the common good
   rather than causing unjustified distortion of competition. If the
   concept is unfamiliar to you, all I can say is that the recent
   decision to provide further funding to Amtrak falls under the angle of
   our policy on services of general interest!
   
   All of these issues - state aids, liberalisation and services of
   general economic interest - will of course be of particular importance
   in the years ahead in view of the imminent enlargement of the EU to
   include a number of countries whose transition from a command economy
   is very recent.
   
   But our state aids policy should not be viewed separately from
   antitrust and merger enforcement. A striking recent example of the
   complementary functions of antitrust and State aid rules is to be
   found in the decisions recently adopted by the Commission concerning
   Deutsche Post - the German public postal operator - following
   complaints from the US firm, UPS.
   
   The wider point at issue in these decisions is "cross-subsidisation"
   between activities covered by special or exclusive rights granted by a
   Member States to a company, such as a statutory monopoly, and
   activities open to competition. In Europe, this issue arises mainly in
   network industries, such as energy or postal services, in which
   liberalisation is not complete. In two recent decisions concerning
   Deutsche Post, the Commission tackled "cross-subsidisation" both as an
   antitrust abuse under Article 82 EC and also under the State aid rules
   - Article 88 EC:
   
   On 20 March 2001, the Commission adopted a decision under Article 82
   of the EC Treaty in which it condemned Deutsche Post for abusing its
   dominant position - held by virtue of its statutory monopoly over
   standard letter delivery. The abuse consisted in offering certain
   door-to-door parcel services - a market which is open to competition -
   at a price that did not cover the additional cost of maintaining the
   necessary network capacity. Prices below the additional or incremental
   cost of providing a competitive service were deemed predatory, if such
   a policy is sustained for a five year period.
   
   For most companies, the competition law analysis would stop there,
   once the finding of predatory pricing had been made. Deutsche Post,
   however, was also in receipt of public monies, so the Commission had
   to look at whether this money had been misused by Deutsche Post to
   fund the predatory activity.
   
   On June 18, 2002 the Commission concluded its State aid proceedings
   with respect to various forms of State aid granted to Deutsche Post.
   It found that the German postal incumbent had used 572 million of the
   State funds it received to finance its monopoly public service
   missions to subsidise below-cost pricing in competitive door-to-door
   parcel services. Postal incumbents that receive State funding for the
   discharge of services of general interest may not use these State
   resources to subsidise below-cost prices in activities open to
   competition.
   
   Thus, the parallel application of antitrust and State aid rules
   allowed the Commission to tackle the "cross-subsidy" issue in a
   comprehensive manner ensuring:
   
   First, that the incumbent is aware that in activities open to
   competition at least the additional costs of the service have to be
   covered by revenue; and
   
   Secondly, that the competitive advantage resulting from the aid
   received by the door-to-door activities is neutralised because
   Deutsche Post has to give back the amount of 572 million of State
   funds it used to subsidise below-cost pricing.
   
   These cases also highlight the complementarity of antitrust and State
   aid remedies. As part of the antitrust proceedings, Deutsche Post, in
   January 2002, created a separate door-to-door parcel subsidiary. The
   Commission accepted this undertaking because it deemed that structural
   separation, together with a commercial relationship based on market
   prices between the two separate entities should in the future avoid
   both predatory pricing and the "spill-over" of State aid into
   competitive activities. In this way, our anti-trust rules were of help
   in avoiding potential future state aid problems.
   
   A further area which we will undoubtedly be having to tackle over the
   coming months is the boundary between legitimate extension of
   advantages in the context of fiscal policy - for example tax
   incentives for environmentally-friendly energy sources or for
   strategic groups of consumers - and illegitimate discrimination which
   harms competition. Our concept of State Aid is therefore not just
   about block grants but about harmful financial advantages in general.
   I am sure you can see the connection here too with moves to ensure
   greater fiscal harmonisation across the EU's Member States. Obviously
   the stronger the framework of EU regulation of national taxation, the
   less need there is to ensure compatibility of national tax regimes
   through application of the State Aid rules.
   
   Merger Control Policy
   
   Since 1990, the Commission has been entrusted with the task of
   providing a "one stop shop" for the scrutiny of all large cross-border
   mergers in Europe within the framework of tight legal deadlines. The
   ability of a public administration to deliver economically sensible
   decisions within a timetable that corresponds to that of business has
   been widely appreciated. Today, we need to build on this record and
   ensure that the Regulation remains adapted to the economic realities.
   We also need to ensure that we work to high standards of transparency
   and fairness, with due regard to, and protection of, the rights of all
   those involved
   
   With this aim in mind, the Commission adopted a Green Paper on the
   review of the Merger Regulation in December of last year. The scope of
   the issues raised by the Review process is impressive. All interested
   parties were invited to comment on the Green Paper by the end of
   March. And it will come as no surprise to you that many seized the
   opportunity - US law firms and companies amongst them. Those comments
   are now being analysed with a view to formulating proposals for the
   amendment of the Merger Regulation by the end of this year.
   
   So now is not the time for definitive answers. Instead, I will
   concentrate on three of the more interesting issues. The question of
   the substantive test, efficiencies and due process.
   
   The substantive test - dominance versus substantial lessening of
   competition 
   
   As you are aware, US and EU merger control laws are phrased in quite
   different language. In the EU, mergers must be declared unlawful where
   they "create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which
   effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common
   market or a substantial part of it". In the US, in the words of a
   statute dating from 1914, mergers can be enjoined if they result in "a
   substantial lessening of competition" or "tend to create a monopoly".
   
   It doesn't require any great legal or economic insight to see that
   these are tests which could, in the hands of creative interpreters,
   result in widely differing outcomes. This has not happened, however,
   because the economic rationale underpinning merger control by
   enforcement authorities and courts in our jurisdictions is very
   similar. The body of precedent built up by the European Commission and
   the European Courts over a decade regarding the interpretation of the
   dominance test has shown a remarkable coincidence of analysis with the
   wealth of interpretative precedent that has been built up in the US
   over a much longer period with regard to the Clayton Act. A European
   practitioner who picks up the US Merger Guidelines, or who delves into
   one of the US Court's latest merger judgements, will - I think - be
   struck by the extent to which our seemingly different tests are used
   in similar ways.
   
   But now that the Merger Regulation has been in force for more than a
   decade, the time is ripe to consider how effective the substantive
   test has been compared to that used in other jurisdictions,
   particularly the US but also in a significant number of EU Member
   States. As Commissioner Monti has recently stressed, we have a
   genuinely open mind on this issue. What counts is the effectiveness of
   the legal instrument in addressing genuine competition concerns.
   
   What is clear from the comments we have received on the issue is that
   the pros and cons of change versus status quo are finely balanced.
   Some see advantages in the SLC test as being better suited to the kind
   of micro-economic analysis required in merger cases. They point to the
   potential difficulties of dealing satisfactorily with situations of
   collective dominance under the existing EU test or "stretching" the
   notion of dominance for purposes of Article 82 enforcement. I refer in
   particular to the issue of whether to cover, in addition to tacit
   collusion, the so-called unilateral effects of increased concentration
   on an oligopolistic market.
   
   Those in favour of the status quo also have an array of arguments to
   hand. Notably, they highlight the point to which I have already
   referred: even today our different tests have led to broadly
   convergent results. The uncertainties caused by doing away with more
   than 10 years of case-law and jurisprudence were the test to be
   changed also figures highly.
   
   One thing is certain: regardless of the decision ultimately taken by
   the Commission on the headline test, guidelines on how to assess
   market power in merger analysis are needed. The Commissioner has
   committed the Commission to produce such a text by the end of the
   year. In the final analysis, the extent to which legal interpretation
   allows us to achieve greater convergence in enforcement through
   issuing new guidelines without changing the law, must be carefully
   weighed up against the alternative of changing the law and then
   developing guidelines which make the transition from existing case law
   and jurisprudence a sensible and practical alternative.
   
   Efficiencies
   
   And now to 'efficiencies. Article 2.1 (b) of the EU's merger
   regulation stipulates that the appraisal of a merger has to take into
   account 'the development of technical and economic progress provided
   that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to
   competition'. In disencrypted language, this could be read to mean we
   are prepared to take into account efficiencies in a positive sense if
   the benefits are likely to be passed on to the consumer. We are also
   guided by the fundamental test enshrined in the Merger Regulation
   which asks us to identify and remedy situations which 'significantly
   impede competition'.
   
   Some commentators - even eminent US ones - have criticised the
   Commission's incapacity or unwillingness to offset efficiencies of a
   merger against its restrictive effects on competition. The guidelines
   on the assessment of market power in merger analysis to which I have
   already referred will state once and for all that efficiencies can be
   taken into account positively. However, my feeling from the recent
   consultation process is that few on our side of the Atlantic are in
   favour of giving an advantage to the merging parties where the
   post-merger competitive conditions make it extremely unlikely that
   consumers can benefit from the efficiencies. It is also important to
   balance short term benefits e.g. of price reductions against possible
   disadvantages in the longer term e.g. progressive withdrawal of the
   remaining competitors from the markets concerned. Can I nevertheless
   conclude these remarks on efficiencies by confirming quite
   categorically that there no 'efficiencies offence' in our merger
   policy.
   
   Now I would like to turn to two aspects of what we could usefully call
   the application of the Sy Rogers test to EU merger control. Sy Rogers
   was, as you know, the composer of that well-known title of corporate
   seminars: "it ain't what you do it's the way that you do it". The
   first aspect is the process and the second is the issue of the quality
   of economic and market analysis.
   
   Due process
   
   As you know, the procedural differences between the EU and US merger
   control systems are significant. In contrast to the US, the Commission
   can approve or prohibit a transaction by taking an administrative
   decision duly motivated within strict deadlines. It need not prosecute
   a potentially problematic merger in court.
   
   I should say here that administrative merger control systems like ours
   are certainly not unique to the Commission. Indeed, this is the model
   employed in most of the EU's Member States, and reflects to a large
   extent the specific legal traditions on our side of the Atlantic.
   
   History, as always, plays its part in explaining this fundamentally
   different role of the respective enforcement agencies. In any event,
   very few respondents to the Green Paper favour a radical overhaul of
   the current system - the introduction of a US-style prosecutorial
   regime, for example, whereby the Commission would have to challenge a
   proposed merger before the European courts.
   
   The fact that so few have called for a fundamental transformation of
   our system is certainly not attributable to the timidity of those who
   submitted comments, as clearly shown by their comments on other
   aspects! On the contrary, I think it is because many recognise the
   merits inherent in the EU system whereby the "first instance" decision
   is taken by an administrative body such as the Commission. Indeed, as
   US Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Charles James mentioned in
   a recent speech(4), many companies have indicated a preference for
   what he termed the EU's "front-end" process (treatment of a case by
   the Commission in its role as competition agency) and at the same time
   for the US's "back-end" process (judicial involvement in the case).
   Our "front-end" process is prized by many for two main reasons: it
   guarantees a swift outcome (usually within one month, but never in
   more than five) and it is remarkably transparent: every notification
   results in a published and fully reasoned decision.
   
   However, as in every system, there is scope for improvement. The
   consultation has brought to light certain misgivings about the
   effectiveness of the system's due process guarantees and concerning
   the possibilities for effective judicial review of the Commission's
   decisions in merger cases.
   
   In terms of due process, criticism focuses on the fact that decisions
   in merger cases are taken by the same body (the Commission) that
   carries out the fact-finding investigation. In sum, critics tend to
   highlight what they perceive as weak rights of defence - do the
   investigators properly consider the views of the merging parties - and
   inadequate checks and balances.
   
   While some respondents take the view that a radical overhaul of the
   system is needed, the majority feel that there are significant
   improvements to be made to the existing system without losing its
   current benefits. Careful thought will therefore be given to the
   numerous suggestions, even the most radical ones, as to how our
   administrative system might be improved. Some may involve amendments
   to the Merger Regulation, but many would not. Indeed, the Commission
   has already taken some steps recently to strengthen the mandate of the
   Hearing Officer whose task it is to enforce the parties' rights.
   However, the time is certainly ripe for a more fundamental look at the
   internal operation of the department in order to reinforce internal
   checks and balances. Under the authority of Mario Monti, that will be
   one of my priorities in my new role.
   
   As far as judicial review is concerned, it's important to stress that
   all of the Commission's administrative decisions may be appealed
   before the European courts. Their role in merger policy should not be
   underestimated. The recent judgment against the Commission in the
   Airtours case provides eloquent testimony of that fact. The real issue
   of course is not whether decisions are subject to judicial review but
   how quickly the judgment is delivered. If it is to have any relevance
   to an agreement which is still commercially viable, the judgement must
   be taken in weeks and months, and not months and years. I feel
   strongly that this is one of the essential issues that must be
   addressed. Evaluating the impact of the Court of First Instance's
   recent adoption of new rules of procedure for the accelerated
   treatment of certain cases is a first step. But I for one would not
   rule out giving the notifying parties to a merger formal rights to
   expedited appeal on prohibitions and remedies before the Community
   courts. 'Fast Track' is a term much abused by airport authorities and
   governments. However what we real need is a genuine fast track, and
   much faster than the present accelerated procedure. That would
   certainly have resource implications for the courts; increasing the
   numbers of judges would also require a change to the Union's founding
   Treaties. But at a time when changes to the Treaty are being discussed
   in any event, that need not be an insuperable barrier.
   
   Economic and market analysis
   
   A separate - if related - criticism of the Commission's enforcement of
   merger control concerns the quality of the economic and market
   analysis underlying decisions. So a focus on outcomes rather than
   process. In this context, some respondents have queried whether
   investigative staff in the department are sufficiently expert - and
   notably whether is a shortage of suitable economic expertise. The more
   general question of whether staff resources are adequate for the tasks
   entrusted has also been raised.
   
   This said, efforts to strengthen the economic expertise of staff in
   the Competition department are on-going. As Commissioner Monti has
   said the recruitment of suitably qualified economists is a staff
   resources priority. We are also giving careful consideration to other
   measures to strengthen those capabilities further. Above all, this
   means reflection on the role of economic advisers in our
   decision-making process. I also put particular weight on the need to
   draw on sectoral expertise as prospective analysis of the likely
   development of markets is the core of merger control. We have not for
   example achieved state-of-the-art analysis of competition conditions
   in the evolving markets for air transport, media or
   telecommunications.
   
   Anti-trust
   
   Reforms in the field of anti-trust are rather more advanced. This is
   hardly surprising when one considers that EU anti-trust rules have
   been in place for more than 40 years as compared to 12 for merger
   control. The last few years have seen an unprecedented wave of reform
   of both substance and procedures. Concentration on the most important
   cases at the EU level as judged by economic affect has been key. In
   turn, policy on vertical and horizontal agreements has been reformed.
   And work is nearing completion on the most ambitious aspect of the
   reform programme: the updating and modernisation of our antitrust
   procedural framework in order to increase the efficiency of
   enforcement.
   
   In September 2000, the Commission put forward to the Council of the
   European Union a proposal to reform the main procedural Regulation for
   antitrust law enforcement (Regulation 17 of 1962) which, when
   approved, will lead to profound changes in our enforcement system.
   These changes will among other things bring the European enforcement
   system closer to the US model.
   
   The administrative notification mechanism, for which there exists no
   equivalent in US law, will be removed. The rule that contains the
   conditions for an agreement to be declared legal, Article 81(3), will
   become directly applicable. This means that all courts and competition
   authorities throughout the European Union will be able to conduct a
   full assessment of agreements brought before them by assessing their
   anti-competitive as well as their pro-competitive effects. Should the
   legal conditions be fulfilled, they can rule that an agreement is
   legal and must be respected by the parties, just like courts in the
   US.
   
   The new enforcement system is designed to strengthen the deterrent
   effect of the EC antitrust rules. It will permit the Commission to
   focus on serious infringements that do considerable harm to consumers
   and it will de-block the enforcement potential of the national
   competition authorities. In passing I should say that the emphasis on
   serious infringements is already underway. In recent times, the
   Commission has adopted a series of high-profile cartel decisions - in
   products ranging from vitamins and food additives to financial
   services and chemicals. And in 2001 alone, we imposed fines amounting
   to 1.8 billion Euros on nearly 60 European and foreign companies.
   These fines exceeded the total fines imposed between the creation of
   the EU and 2000.
   
   The removal of the notification system should over time make it more
   attractive for private complainants to address themselves to civil
   courts if they are the victim of illegal behaviour under the
   competition rules. Through a gradual increase in private law-suits,
   the courts in Europe should make an ever greater contribution to the
   over-all enforcement of the rules, leading to a situation more similar
   to that already prevailing in the US.
   
   In order to promote coherent application of the rules, we have also
   proposed to the Council to introduce the possibility for the
   competition authorities to appear before national courts as amicus
   curiae, on the model of the US enforcement agencies. Legal certainty
   would be enhanced by means of opinions from the Commission - reasoned
   and published statements on unresolved issues of fact or law, similar
   to the Business Review Letters adopted by the US agencies. I think
   that this ought to address the concerns of industry without
   reintroducing a kind of notification mechanism with all of its
   drawbacks.
   
   We are confident that all these measures will be relatively quickly
   approved by the Council. That is crucial as they need to be in force
   before the next enlargement of the EU takes place.
   
   Conclusion
   
   With this brief overview, I hope to have convinced you that
   competition policy is now very much at the heart of the EU's policy
   agenda. There is certainly more than enough to keep both Mario Monti
   and a new Director General for competition in the Commission occupied
   in the months and years ahead. And of course in this brief speech I've
   done little more than scratch the surface. However, I confidently
   expect that by the date of your next conference, we will have provided
   you with many of our own answers to the questions I have raised here
   today.
   
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