FC: Marc Rotenberg replies to Stu Baker on Echelon, advises hearings

[Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>]

*********
In response to: http://www.politechbot.com/p-02080.html
Background: http://www.mccullagh.org/cgi-bin/politech.cgi?name=echelon
*********

Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 13:49:43 -0400
To: declan () well com
From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg () epic org>

To put this debate in some perspective, it is important to
understand that the Echelon inquiry of the European Parliament
began with a very real concern about US economic espionage
based on the loss of certain commercial contracts and prior
experience with electronic surveillance of European trade
officials.

But that is not where the report ends up. The final report
makes clear that electronic surveillance raises far-reaching
issues concerning the rights of citizens and the need for
government accountability. It cites international human
rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. It urges adoption of better techniques, such
as encryption, to safeguard private communications. It draws
attention to growing concerns about surveillance by EU
countries. It is the most far-reaching report to date on
the extent of electronic surveillance by government.

I think Jim Bamford describes the problem well in his
recent book _Body of Secrets_ when he says:

  The issue for Europe is not whether UKUSA's Echelon
  system is stealing trade secrets from foreign
  businesses and passing them on to competitors; it
  is not. The real issue is far more important: it is
  whether Echelon is doing away with individual privacy
  -- a basic human right.

Bamford concludes:

  Unchecked, UKUSA's worldwide eavesdropping network
  could become a sort of cyber secret police, without
  courts, juries, or the right to a defense.

His words are eerily reminiscent of the warning from
Senator Frank Church almost thirty years ago that if
the NSA were ever allowed to use its powers domestically,
"No American would have any privacy left. . . . There
would be no place to hide."

In many respects, the Report of the European Parliament
on Echelon is similar to the Church Committee report and
fulfills one of the key tasks of public officials -- to
hold government accountable for its actions.

Patriotism, it would seem to me, now requires the US Congress
to begin the investigation that is has too long delayed into
the growing surveillance capabilities of the US intelligence
agencies.

Marc Rotenberg
EPIC

*********

Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 15:20:09 -0700
To: declan () well com
From: John Young <jya () pipeline com>
Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel
  agencies
In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010530131834.0299aec0 () mail well com>

Stewart Baker makes a surprising statement:

>To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship
>between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of
>a kind that has never existed in our country.

No US intelligence agency operates without close, usually long-term,
relationships with its corporate suppliers for a very wide range of products
and services. There also exchange personnel for particular tasks.
They attend conferences and continuing eduction programs together.
They share experiences in foreign countries. Ex-members of intel agencies
work for corporations, set up corporations, and some thereafter return
to the agencies, and then back to corporations. They mutually teach
and recruit and give references. They spin in concert, they sometimes
disagree and make up. They belong to intelligence alumini organizations
and go on retreats and travel to foreign forums to backslap and enjoy
the benefits of hawking sometimes stale information as if pure gold.

The only thing that distinguishes US intelligence beneficiaries from
their foreign competitors is the faint difference in moxie, in protestations
of innocence, in swearing others do what we do not, never did, never
will. That story changes to be sure when a bestseller is written to
beat the homeland competition. What spies and their groupies do to
stigmatize renegades is wondrous. The less these spokespeople
know about the true innards of intelligence the louder they advertize
hire me.

*********

Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 14:18:26 -0400
To: declan () well com
From: e cummings <bernies () netaxs com>
Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel
  agencies
Cc: SBaker () steptoe com
In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010530131834.0299aec0 () mail well com>

At 01:23 PM 5/30/01 -0400, SBaker () steptoe com wrote:
...

To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship
between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of
a kind that has never existed in our country.
...

stewart baker's assumption is false.  u.s. intelligence agencies routinely 
work with high-level u.s corporate officials to "employ" undercover 
operatives in target countries.  during the covert operation (which in many 
cases lasts for years) the u.s. intelligence agency operative functions as 
a normal u.s corporate employee abroad, and is paid soley by the selected 
u.s. corporation to avoid any potential exposure.  the operative's 
intelligence duties are done 'on the side' without further financial 
compensation.

this was personally explained to me by tony mendez while i visited his home 
last fall.  tony is a former high-ranking CIA intelligence officer.  his 
recently published book, "The Master of Disguise - My Secret Life in the 
CIA" is worth reading: http://www.themasterofdisguise.com/

it is hardly a stretch to assume that u.s. intelligence agencies would, in 
turn, informally return the favors of u.s corporations (via the same secure 
channels they were initially transacted through) by occasionally passing on 
economic intelligence information of value to the u.s. corporation that 
provided that agency with assistance.


-bernieS
"CALEA's first Casualty"

*********

From: jonathan.winkler () yale edu
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Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 15:17:01 -0500
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To: "Ian BROWN" <I.Brown () cs ucl ac uk>, <declan () well com>
Subject: Re: Re: FC: More on Echelon, intercepts, and a quick history lesson
X-UIDL: acba714051081ea978a6a4e35463eeff

Declan and Ian,

At first I thought my note came across as a bit naive, but now I believe
I'll stand by it, with clarification.  The United States certainly
gathers intelligence on foreign commercial activities all the time from
a variety of sources, and most of these certainly are passed on to U.S.
firms where appropriate.  Part of the U.S. diplomatic effort abroad has
always been assisting U.S. firms doing business overseas.

However, I haven't seen much evidence to distinguish between commercial
intelligence gathered by U.S. diplomats or the CIA and that obtained
specifically through signals intelligence (the Echelon system).  My
question would have to stand: is there evidence, anecdotal or otherwise,
that would suggest the capture of sensitive commercial information
through the Echelon system that could not have been obtained in another
manner?  The European complaint seems to be against the Echelon system,
and its potential use for industrial espionage, not against industrial
espionage per se.  The distinction isn't clear.

The materials contained in the links sent by Ian are a case in point.
The documents on Indonesia identify that CIA people sat on a committee
to discuss encouraging trade with that country, but does not indicate
how signals intelligence specifically is brought in to help US firms.
Doing so, given the volume of traffic on the cables and the satellites,
would be a serious drain on the NSA's resources:  how would they
prioritize US businesses over other more pressing militaryor diplomatic
matters?

As for the historical example, I've turned up evidence that some in the
State Department believed the British cable companies were themselves
turning over copies of traffic to other British companies, and that the
British government was out of the loop on the matter.

Thanks,

Jonathan
_____________

Ian replied:
The procedures for deidentifying and routing intelligence to commercial

companies seem to be substantially in place...

Declan replied:
>I respectfully disagree with Jonathan's position, at least as I
understand
>it. Much has changed since the early 1900s, and the executive branch
now is
>entirely capable of picking corporate favorites in the marketplace...
>
>I admit that the NSA has a far greater interest in keeping its sources

>secret than the White House does in rewarding donors. And I have not
seen
>reliable evidence showing Echelon intercepts are used in this manner.

*********

Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 16:17:20 -0400
To: declan () well com
From: Ed Stone <estone () synernet com>
Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel
  agencies

> From: "Baker, Stewart" <SBaker () steptoe com>
> To: "'declan () well com'" <declan () well com>
> <snip>
> The people who choose careers
> in national security do it mainly for reasons of patriotism, and certainly
> not so they can be part of a patronage machine.

They do however take orders and are allowed only piecemeal views into the 
meaning and use of their secretly gathered and secrety utilized harvest. 
Compartmentalization, multi-billion dollar budgets, staffs in the thousands 
and secrecy protected by threat of imprisionment are a sufficient 
combination to permit, if not encourage, misdeed of this near absolute 
information power. Two or three staff members among the White House 
National Security Advisor's staff (remember "plumbers"? Ollie North?) 
operating "independently" (if caught) would be a sufficient core to have a 
conversation with a Commerce Department undersecretary of political 
origins. Alternatively we can believe that our intelligence services would 
out of principle not deploy information regarding our largest exporter 
(aviation/aerospace) getting its head handed to it by foreign competitors.

>   Such a use of intelligence
> would be reported quickly to Congressional oversight bodies that have often
> been in the hands of the opposition party.

But foxes being foxes, neither the red nor gray foxes confuse themselves 
with the chickens.


> To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship
> between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of
> a kind that has never existed in our country.

The Glomar Explorer was built on open bids? You can provide certification 
of Ron Brown's conversations related to NIST leakage of interest to 
commercial entities? An NSA General has no list of former DOD 
undersecretaries now scattered in the Fortune 100? Our intelligence 
services have neither experience nor capability in conveying information 
(or explosives) with adequate cutouts and plausible deniability? We now 
know from Mr. Bamford's book that the Joint Chiefs in the 60's looked 
favorably on an intel proposal to kill Americans on US streets so it could 
be blamed on Cuba as pretext for invasion, but we are to believe they draw 
the line at commercial espionage that would benefit the US?

*********

Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 13:04:45 -0700
From: "James J. Lippard" <lippard () discord org>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>
Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencies

> From: "Baker, Stewart" <SBaker () steptoe com>
> To: "'declan () well com'" <declan () well com>
> cc: "Albertazzie, Sally" <SAlbertazzie () steptoe com>
> Subject: RE: More on Echelon, intercepts, and a quick history lesson
> Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 12:10:43 -0400
>
> Declan,
>
> Jonathan is right, your rant notwithstanding.  The people who choose careers
> in national security do it mainly for reasons of patriotism, and certainly
> not so they can be part of a patronage machine.  Such a use of intelligence
> would be reported quickly to Congressional oversight bodies that have often
> been in the hands of the opposition party.
>
> To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship
> between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of
> a kind that has never existed in our country.  Since such relationships do

See Laton McCartney, _Friends in High Places: The Bechtel Story_, 1988,
Simon & Schuster.

--
Jim Lippard        lippard () discord org       http://www.discord.org/
PGP Key ID: 0xF8D42CFE

*********

Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 10:49:50 -0700
From: lizard <lizard () mrlizard com>
To: declan () well com
CC: politech () politechbot com
Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencies

Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
> **********
> In response to: http://www.politechbot.com/p-02078.html
> **********
>
> From: "Baker, Stewart" <SBaker () steptoe com>
> To: "'declan () well com'" <declan () well com>
> cc: "Albertazzie, Sally" <SAlbertazzie () steptoe com>
> Subject: RE: More on Echelon, intercepts, and a quick history lesson
> Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 12:10:43 -0400
>
> Declan,
>
> Jonathan is right, your rant notwithstanding.  The people who choose careers
> in national security do it mainly for reasons of patriotism, and certainly
> not so they can be part of a patronage machine.

'Patriotism:The first refuge of a scoundrel.' (Samuel Johnson)

People join the army out of patriotism, too. This doesn't mean they
don't end up blowing up buildings in Oklahoma City.

*********

From: "Jones, Greg" <greg.jones () qci net>
To: "'declan () well com'" <declan () well com>
Subject: RE: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencie
        s
Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 14:06:50 -0400

I have to respond -- the sophistry is killing me.

To allege that there has never been an intimate relationship between
American intelligence agencies and corporate America is absurd.  That
expects us to ignore the existence of politics, politicians, special
interests, corruption, and the entire defense industry.

American arms and money delivered to third world despots by the CIA or other
agents of the Intelligence Community are a cliche.  No one believes that
those adventures were financed by purely private, well-meaning patriots from
their own pockets.

Finally, we have the recent case of the rogue FBI agent selling secrets, and
what protection would there be to prevent such behavior on an industrial
espionage basis?  It would only take an "intimate" relationship between two
people.  Just two!

To expect us to believe that such a relationship "has never existed in our
country" and therefore could never exist denies the very existence of
Echelon, itself, which could not have been developed and implemented without
an intimate relationship between the American intelligence agencies that use
it and the corporate American entities that produced its components, made
connections to the network possible, and maintain the system.

As the Brits would say, "Pull the other one, it has bells on."

*********




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