RE: Cain a& Abel Question

["Cushing, David" <David.Cushing () hitachisoftware com>]

> Persumably a cunning attack vector would be to compromise a 
> private network, generate a self signed certificate and use 
> windows 2000 group policy to deliver your untrusted root ca 
> as a trusted ca into everyones browser. Then C&A and Doug 
> Songs tools would work without warning??

If you configured them to use that same cert for signing, you're correct.  

Of course, if you own the DC, you may want to push out a keyboard sniffer or a proxy address to capture the same data.  
ARP attacks are often noticable.

Another idea is to 'upsell' a regular (valid) certificate.

Mike Benham noted last August that IE was lame in how it checks for valid certificates.  At that time, you could take 
an end user certificate and use it to sign another (fake) certificate.  If you owned one domain name and got a 
certificate, you could impersonate anyone.  Don't know if the example site is still up but the posting is here: 
http://www.thoughtcrime.org/ie-ssl-chain.txt
--
David

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