oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files
From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk () jwilk net>
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2017 19:02:22 +0100
* Jeffrey Walton <noloader () gmail com>, 2017-11-01, 11:31:
Code and scripts certainly need to check TMPDIR
Unfortunately, glibc's implementation of tmpfile(3), which is the most fool-proof interface for dealing with temporary files that the C library offers, doesn't honour TMPDIR. :(
BTW, there's a preloadable library that catches writes to /tmp: https://github.com/paultag/tmperamental -- Jakub Wilk
Current thread:
- Re: Security risk of vim swap files, (continued)
- Re: Security risk of vim swap files Matthias Luft (Nov 07)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Tim (Oct 31)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Kurt H Maier (Oct 31)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Tim (Oct 31)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Steffen Nurpmeso (Oct 31)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Leonid Isaev (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Simon McVittie (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Tim (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Jeffrey Walton (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Kurt Seifried (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Jakub Wilk (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Solar Designer (Nov 01)
- Re: Security risk of vim swap files Ian Zimmerman (Nov 06)
- Re: Security risk of vim swap files Solar Designer (Nov 06)
- Re: Security risk of vim swap files Jakub Wilk (Nov 06)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Kurt H Maier (Oct 31)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Jakub Wilk (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Leonid Isaev (Nov 01)
- Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files Jan Pokorný (Nov 01)