Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files

[Solar Designer <solar () openwall com>]

On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 02:35:59PM +0100, Jakub Wilk wrote:
> There's another problem with vim swapfiles.
>
> If you edit a file directly in /tmp, vim will happily read a swapfile 
> that were planted there by somebody else. Local users could exploit this 
> for denial of service (or maybe worse if there are any swapfile parsing 
> bugs...).
>
> Is that a bug in vim? Or is it a user error to edit file directly in 
> /tmp?

Almost all manual uses of /tmp are user errors, yet we could want to
harden programs to make such misuses less risky.

> In the latter case, we should fix at least vipe(1) and vidir(1) from 
> moreutils; and run-mailcap(1).

Alexander