oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Stack guard canary massaging
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 07:41:04 -0400
On Mon, 2016-10-31 at 12:22 +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:48:45AM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:Sorry for cross-posting.Sorry to bikeshed, but I think this isn't a kernel-hardening topic at all, so the thread should continue on oss-security only, please. Florian, if there's a reason why you think it's kernel-hardening related, please let me know. To me, it looks like userspace hardening that is not even kernel-assisted (at least not directly in this place, even though the kernel may have helped provide the random numbers). If your cross-posting was to reach more of the right people, then you have already done so, and they can join oss-security now. ;-) Alexander
The kernel supports SSP but it doesn't appear to do the same thing. arch/*/include/asm/stackprotector.h Why do the non-x86 implementations XOR in LINUX_VERSION_CODE though? Is it supposed to be a placeholder for a random at compile-time value? :\ It's not harmful but that's just... weird.
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Current thread:
- Stack guard canary massaging Florian Weimer (Oct 31)
- Re: Stack guard canary massaging Solar Designer (Oct 31)
- Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Stack guard canary massaging Daniel Micay (Oct 31)
- Re: Stack guard canary massaging Seth Arnold (Nov 02)
- Re: Stack guard canary massaging Solar Designer (Oct 31)