oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE Request: Linux kernel: remote buffer overflow in usbip


From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2016 10:09:32 +0100

Hello,

Yes, I contacted cve-assign () mitre org and they provided me with the
following number:
CVE-2016-3955

Regards,
Ignat

2016-04-19 9:35 GMT+01:00 Greg KH <greg () kroah com>:
On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 10:06:43AM +0200, Marcus Meissner wrote:
Hi,

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb

commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb
Author: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin () gmail com>
Date:   Thu Mar 17 18:00:29 2016 +0000

    USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write

    Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
    usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
    packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
    part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
    urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
    Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
    preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
    Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.

    Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin () gmail com>
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh () linuxfoundation org>

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
index facaaf0..e40da77 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
        if (!(size > 0))
                return 0;

+       if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+               /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
+               if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
+                       usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+                       return 0;
+               } else {
+                       usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+                       return -EPIPE;
+               }
+       }
+
        ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
        if (ret != size) {
                dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);

Our USB developer confirms:
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=975945
|The vulnerability is true. If an attacker can get a malicious package
|into the connection the kernel will accept all of the data in that
|package whether it fits into the buffer or not.
|You can scribble about 1k into RAM, albeit at an unpredictable location.

I think Ignat already asked for a CVE for this through some other
channel, and was going to announce it in some manner.

Ignat, did you do that?

thanks,

greg k-h


Current thread: