oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Re: CVE request for wget
From: Austin English <austinenglish () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2015 02:37:08 -0600
The fix has been released in 1.7-rc1, https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.7-rc1/index.en.html On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Austin English <austinenglish () gmail com> wrote:
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 6:10 PM, Seth Arnold <seth.arnold () canonical com> wrote:On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 06:57:26PM -0400, cve-assign () mitre org wrote:If there is any additional Tails vulnerability related to this, another CVE ID may be needed. For example, https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-wget/2015-08/msg00050.html says to be 100% sure, you should add --passive-ftp to your command line. If you don't do that, your /etc/wgetrc or ~/.wgetrc could include --no-passive-ftp (or passiveftp = off). If Tails is supposed to try to ensure that, perhaps there's a requirement to have something like: alias wget="wget --passive-ftp" in a system-wide location (possibly /etc/bash.bashrc). The concept of CVE IDs for "failure of a torify step" issues is new, and we aren't sure of the best approach.I suspect using a bash alias in a site-wide config might then qualify for another CVE in the future, along the lines of "programs that spawn wget via system(3), popen(3), or exec family of functions can use unsafeactivemode by accident". If Tails is in the business of fixing these things for safety, removing active ftp support from tools seems like better fix. ThanksA fix has been applied to Tails git: https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/repository/revisions/b9fd6312435d55dd0bc0b6abdb7994da4d66e2b2 In short, the wget binary is moved to /usr/lib/wget/wget, and a wrapper script is put in place in /usr/bin/wget. The wrapper ensures that wget is called via torsocks, and additionally, also forces --passive-ftp. Moving wget to /usr/lib/wget/wget gets the potentially dangerous wget binary out of $PATH. A dedicated attacker could check if /usr/bin/wget is a script and then parse it to find the actual binary, but that would need to be a very dedicated attacker and at that point, there are more feasible attacks available. -- -Austin
-- -Austin
Current thread:
- Re: CVE request for wget cve-assign (Oct 01)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Seth Arnold (Oct 01)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Austin English (Oct 26)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Austin English (Nov 02)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Austin English (Nov 03)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Austin English (Dec 24)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Austin English (Oct 26)
- Re: Re: CVE request for wget Seth Arnold (Oct 01)