oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Re: Debian / xterm #779397


From: Marcus Meissner <meissner () suse de>
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 12:45:50 +0100

On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 10:06:30AM +0000, Simon McVittie wrote:
On 03/03/15 09:19, Thomas Dickey wrote:
| From: "Kurt Seifried" <kseifried () redhat com>
| 
| $ xterm -S/dev/pts/20
| *** buffer overflow detected ***: /usr/bin/xterm terminated
|
| Did this get a CVE? I don't see a DSA for xterm.

no - someone mentioned the problem in an email - nothing more was said

There's some discussion on the Debian bug about whether this should be
considered to be a security vulnerability, or just a bug. Not every
buffer overflow is a vulnerability: it can only be a vulnerability if an
attacker can trigger it.

Is there any reason why it would be useful/sensible to pass untrusted
(pseudo-terminal filename, fd) pairs to the -S option? It seems to me
that if you're passing partially or entirely attacker-controlled
filenames to this option, you have probably already lost.

In modern times xterm should not be setuid root, but there might be legacy
systems where it is.

On Linux with /dev/pts and utempter it should not be necessary anymore for 
10+ years.

Ciao, Marcus


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