oss-sec mailing list archives
neuter the poodle (was: Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon:)
From: mancha <mancha1 () zoho com>
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 22:58:46 +0000
On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 03:40:31PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
Please see: http://www.gnutls.org/security.html#GNUTLS-SA-2014-4 and Nikos' writeup here: http://nmav.gnutls.org/2014/10/what-about-poodle.html From the latter link:The good news is, that only browsers use this construct, and no other applications should be affected.Nikos (or anyone else on OSS-security), are you sure that only browsers do this? what about mail clients like Thunderbird or Mail.app making IMAPS or POPS or submission connections?
SSLv3 is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks on CBC-mode ciphers. This vulnerability, tagged CVE-2014-3566, exists independently of types of clients, servers, or protocols being layered over SSL/TLS. POODLE is a specific attack vector that leverages "protocol fallback" in order to exploit CVE-2014-3566. Notwithstanding reports like "The good news is, that only browsers use this construct, and no other applications should be affected." [1] and "Currently, only HTTPs clients perform out-of-band protocol fallback." [2], I can confirm what you're hinting at. Browsers are not the only client-side applications that implement "protocol fallback". The below transcript shows an MITM-triggered Thunderbird 24.7.0 IMAPS protocol downgrade to SSLv3 even though both peers speak TLSv1. --mancha [1] http://nmav.gnutls.org/2014/10/what-about-poodle.html [2] https://access.redhat.com/node/1232123 ========= transcript ============ Setting up mancha-in-the-middle... 127.0.0.1:44366 -> 127.0.0.1:993 handshake [tls1.0] (client_hello) Start protocol downgrade attack... 127.0.0.1:44371 -> 127.0.0.1:993 handshake [ssl3.0] (client_hello) 127.0.0.1:993 -> 127.0.0.1:44371 handshake [ssl3.0] (server_hello) handshake [ssl3.0] (certificate) handshake [ssl3.0] (server_key_exchange) handshake [ssl3.0] (server_hello_done) 127.0.0.1:44371 -> 127.0.0.1:993 handshake [ssl3.0] (client_key_exchange) change_cipher_spec [ssl3.0] handshake [ssl3.0] (encrypted) 127.0.0.1:993 -> 127.0.0.1:44371 change_cipher_spec [ssl3.0] handshake [ssl3.0] (encrypted) 127.0.0.1:993 -> 127.0.0.1:44371 application_data [ssl3.0] application_data [ssl3.0] =================================
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Current thread:
- RE: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon:, (continued)
- RE: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Sona Sarmadi (Oct 15)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Pierre Schweitzer (Oct 14)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: mancha (Oct 14)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Krassimir Tzvetanov (Oct 14)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Pierre Schweitzer (Oct 15)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Ben Lincoln (0E1C7DBB - OSS) (Oct 15)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Hanno Böck (Oct 15)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: ishish (Oct 16)
- RE: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Sona Sarmadi (Oct 16)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Daniel Kahn Gillmor (Oct 17)
- neuter the poodle (was: Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon:) mancha (Oct 17)
- Re: neuter the poodle (was: Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon:) Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos (Oct 18)
- Re: Re: neuter the poodle mancha (Oct 18)
- Re: Re: neuter the poodle Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos (Oct 18)
- Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be revealed soon: Mark Felder (Oct 17)