oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Question regarding CVE applicability of missing HttpOnly flag


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 12:42:00 -0600

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On 27/06/14 10:35 AM, Vincent Danen wrote:
On 06/26/2014, at 10:00 AM, Kurt Seifried wrote:

On 26/06/14 05:45 AM, Jamie Strandboge wrote:
Based on this email and the one this is in response to, I find
this comment unclear. Is MITRE saying that:

a) lack of implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus scanner,
firewall, <insert hardening software here> does not justify a
CVE because of the complexity? b) lack of implementing SELinux,
AppArmor, virus scanner, firewall, <insert hardening software
here> does not justify a CVE and also cannot be considered an
implementation error because of the complexity? c) implementing
SELinux, AppArmor, virus scanner, firewall, and/or <insert
hardening software here> is not worth it because the added
complexity intrinsically makes the system less secure? d)
something else?

Thanks

So one comment on this, replace the above with "DAC" 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discretionary_access_control) and I
bet we'd hand it a CVE =).

Security lines move, I would expect most modern system of any
type (Windows, Linux, router, maybe not my bathroom scale that
talks wifi... yet) to have some sort of firewall enabled by
default and not simply leave everything exposed to the world. So
in that case not having a fire enabled by default would
definitely violate the principle of least surprise and maybe even
qualify for a CVE.

Wait.  You're saying that not having a firewall enabled by default
qualifies for a CVE?  I mean, firewalls are pretty common sense and
should definitely be used/available/whatever but to say that an
operating system or device doesn't have a firewall enabled by
default should have a CVE assigned seems... excessive, doesn't it?

I'm saying in quite a few common situations it should probably qualify
for a CVE. Not every single situation. Same for HTTPOnly.

How is not having a firewall enabled by default a _vulnerability_?
If we look at it this way, it's a good thing CVEs go past 9999 per
year because we need to change everything we used to call
"hardening" to be a vulnerability, do we not?

How is not having DAC a _vulnerability_? and yet now DAC support is
required....


- -- 
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
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