oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Cookie Reuse
From: Russ Allbery <eagle () eyrie org>
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 14:15:34 -0700
Thomas Williams <thomas () trwilliams me uk> writes:
Would you consider the following scenario a security flaw:
- User can login to an authenticated system - User copies the cookies that are set after they are authenticated - User logs out and the cookies are therefore deleted from their system - User can paste the previously copied cookies allowing them to re-auth without re-entering credentials
Personally, I would feel that given the user has logged out, their expectation is that not only should the cookies be removed from their end, but essentially those cookies should no longer be accepted by the server at a later stage to re-authenticate.
Many bearer token systems have this security property, which is also shared with (e.g.) Kerberos tickets. I think it's a security property to be aware of, but I don't think it's a vulnerability unless the software advertises otherwise. Invalidating issued tokens prior to their expiration time requires storing central session state or some revocation list equivalent, which may be an undesireable or burdensome requirement for the security system as a whole. Bearer tokens with expirations but without central session state (Kerberos, for example) have some useful properties that cannot be easily replicated by state-tracking systems, at the cost of making logout prior to token expiration require destruction of all session keys. -- Russ Allbery (eagle () eyrie org) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
Current thread:
- Cookie Reuse Thomas Williams (Mar 12)
- Re: Cookie Reuse Russ Allbery (Mar 12)