oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE Request: Insecure Software Download in pip


From: Donald Stufft <donald () stufft io>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2013 03:10:24 -0400


On Jul 27, 2013, at 3:08 AM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com> wrote:

On 07/25/2013 03:09 AM, Donald Stufft wrote:
I'd like to request a CVE for pip
(https://pypi.python.org/pypi/pip/).

The mirroring support (-M, --use-mirrors) was implemented without
any sort of authenticity checks and is downloaded over plaintext
HTTP. Further more by default it will dynamically discover the list
of available mirrors by querying a DNS entry and extrapolating from
that data. It does not attempt to use any sort of method of
securing this querying of the DNS like DNSSEC. Software packages
are downloaded over these insecure links, unpacked, and then
typically the setup.py python file inside of them is executed.

The vulnerable code is located at: -
https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/develop/pip/index.py#L60-L64 -
https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/develop/pip/index.py#L205-L207 -
https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/develop/pip/index.py#L553-L572 -
https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/develop/pip/index.py#L999-L1024

The affected versions are every released version since 0.8.1 which
are: 0.8.1, 0.8.2, 0.8.3, 1.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.1, 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.3,
1.3.1, 1.4

I'm not aware of this issue having ever had a CVE requested for it
and my attempts to search the CVE database did not appear to turn
up anything relevant but the search doesn't appear to be the
greatest so I may have missed it.

I'm hoping to land a patch for this in a future release (current
iteration of patch available at
https://github.com/dstufft/pip/compare/remove-mirror-support) but
there is no planned fix version as of yet.

----------------- Donald Stufft PGP: 0x6E3CBCE93372DCFA // 7C6B
7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA

Was it supposed to be secure (like was this explicitly supposed to be
all encrypted/etc.)? This sounds more like security hardening than a
security vulnerability.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993


The mirroring protocol explicitly included provisions for verification which
was not being done.

http://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0381/#mirror-authenticity

-----------------
Donald Stufft
PGP: 0x6E3CBCE93372DCFA // 7C6B 7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA

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