oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE request for a Drupal contributed module


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2013 01:06:26 -0600

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On 07/22/2013 12:22 PM, Forest Monsen wrote:
Hi Kurt, regarding CVE assignment and your request for
clarification at 
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/05/16/2:

On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 6:41 PM, Kurt Seifried
<kseifried () redhat com> wrote:

This sounds like two separate issues:
[...]
can you send me the code patches fixing this so I can make sure
it gets the correct SPLIT/MERGE treatment? Thanks.

Yep - Diffs for the commits that fixed both of these issues are
at:

Drupal 6:
http://drupalcode.org/project/ga_login.git/commitdiff/dd04ea3 
Drupal 7:
http://drupalcode.org/project/ga_login.git/commitdiff/c365097

For the first issue,


Accidental removal of account configuration.

In certain scenarios, Google Authenticator login incorrectly 
determines the user's account name. The change in account name
could cause the two-factor authentication for existing accounts
to be lost, allowing users to log in using just username and
password.

This vulnerability is mitigated by the fact while Google
Authenticator login's additional verification is by-passed, a
username and password are still required to log in.


It looks like the maintainer now concatenates a "Realm" (site name)
and suffix with the Drupal username to form the GA username. Any
inconsistency there will invalidate earlier credentials.

Please use CVE-2013-4177 for this issue.

For the second,

One Time Password (OTP) replay

If an attacker can intercept a login request with a username,
password and OTP, an attacker could use this same data again to
login to the website.

This vulnerability is mitigated by the fact that an attacker who
can intercept a login request with this level of detail can
usually also intercept the ongoing session identifying token.


It looks to me like the maintainer now implements a skew value to
either (in the case of a time-based one-time password token) review
only a certain range of timed tokens on either side, or (in the
case of an HMAC-based one-time password token) to again test a
range of tokens.

I'll copy the Drupal Security Team, in case I haven't understood
it correctly or if further clarification is necessary. Thanks.

Please use CVE-2013-4178 for this issue.

Best, Forest



- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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