oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability
From: Russ Allbery <rra () stanford edu>
Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2013 11:24:19 -0700
Vincent Danen <vdanen () redhat com> writes:
I've suggested to upstream that if they want this to be used seriously for trust (and not just verifying that the distribution is untampered with, according to whomever was able to sign the SIGNATURE file), that they should disable the auto-retrieval of keys by default and/or CPAN should manage their own keyserver of trusted keys and cpansign should only pull from that keyserver. The first is probably practical enough to do, the second I'm not so sure.
Speaking as a CPAN author, the second would be awesome. For bonus points, once one registers a key with CPAN, CPAN could then even check one's uploads and disallow uploads that aren't signed with the proper key. It would require work by the CPAN maintainers, but the general infrastructure is in place to do things like this and one could bootstrap from CPAN username/password. -- Russ Allbery (rra () stanford edu) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
Current thread:
- CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability Vincent Danen (Jun 05)
- Re: CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability Russ Allbery (Jun 05)
- Re: CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability 唐鳳 (Jun 05)
- Re: CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability Daniel Kahn Gillmor (Jun 05)
- Re: CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability Vincent Danen (Jun 11)
- Re: CVE-2013-2145: perl Module::Signature code execution vulnerability Russ Allbery (Jun 05)