oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Zimbra XSS in aspell.php, CVE request


From: Michael Scherer <misc () zarb org>
Date: Sat, 06 Apr 2013 02:14:32 +0200

Le vendredi 05 avril 2013 à 18:05 -0600, Kurt Seifried a écrit :
On 04/05/2013 04:21 AM, Michael Scherer wrote:
Hi,

While trying to see how hard a bug would be to fix in Zimbra
during a discussion with a coworker, I stumbled across a XSS flaw
in Zimbra, in a spell checking external webservice.

Since I didn't found the public web interface for the source code
of Zimbra and since perforce is not as straightforward to run on
linux than git and slow to download the 2G of source code, I
recommend to people to look at the github mirror, even if this mean
losing some information and changelog.

The issue is on this file : 
https://github.com/Zimbra-Community/zimbra-sources/blob/master/main/ZimbraServer/src/php/aspell.php


The problem is that $dictionary is coming from user input ( from
GET parameters ), since it is a copy of $_REQUEST. Then if no text
is given ( and so $text is empty ), it is printed back in the html
form displayed without any kind of sanitization at all ( line133 : 
https://github.com/Zimbra-Community/zimbra-sources/blob/master/main/ZimbraServer/src/php/aspell.php#L133
)

So a attacker could inject javascript/html there just by giving
crafted link to a user, running as the domain of zimbra ( albeit on
a different port ). Something like 
http://example.org/aspell.php?disctionnary=><script> 
alert('foo');</script>

( with proper url encoding of course ).

Due to typecasting, "" is considered as equal to NULL for '==',
while it may not be the case in other circumstances.

If I am not wrong, the default location for the spell checking
service is http://$config{HOSTNAME}:7780/aspell.php, so a
improperly secured server ( ie, without a firewall ) could be
vulnerable to javascript injection, which could be used to steal
various informations ( like the session cookie ).

However, depending on the browser and the security setting, the
issue could be mitigated, even if it seems we can still steal the
cookie with a spear phising attempt (
http://seckb.yehg.net/2012/06/xss-gaining-access-to-httponly-cookie.html
)

The issue can be tested quite easily, just take any php hosting, 
download the aspell.php file there and run :

$ curl 
'http://www.example.org/aspell.php?dictionary=insert_html_here_with<blink>'

 You should see that the html code is inserted back in the form. I
didn't spent time on writing a trivial exploit for that.

Upstream have been notified on 2013-01-12 on a private bug (
https://bugzilla.zimbra.com/show_bug.cgi?id=79640 ), with first
answer on 2013-02-22, along with a fix following on the next hours.
However, the fix is incorrect, and my attempt to make the coder
change his mind failed.

The fix that was written can be found on a aggregate commit on 
https://github.com/Zimbra-Community/zimbra-sources/commit/e7682c00be82a0c3ab51ee92f518bdcc1e07536c#L3L148

 While that could fix a XSS issue if the code was correctly used,
there was no security issue since the call of the function is wrong
on line 67, we see 1 parameter is missing and the value of
$dictionnary is overwrote by the return code and is always 0, so we
cannot inject anything with it.

As I couldn't convince upstream to correct this, and given that I
have let enough time to react to them after following the
procedure, I consider that full disclosure is the next step to have
it corrected.

Can someone assign a CVE for it ?


Is this also in the open source version?

http://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Building_Zimbra_using_Perforce

I only used the open source version ( since I doubt the other version is
cloned on github, that would kinda be a license violation ) and I do not
have access to the closed source one ( or rather, i didn't tried very
hard to have access to it to check, as I would not be able to link to
source code for verification )

However, I suspect that's the same for non open source one ( ie, I see
no reason to have less features in the commercial version )

-- 
Michael Scherer


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