oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: debian: gpg --verify suggests entire file was verified, even if file contains auxiliary data


From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg () fifthhorseman net>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2013 14:32:36 -0400

On 04/17/2013 02:23 PM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
I've run into this before, sadly enigmail (Thunderbird gpg plugin)
displays the same green bar for message signed ok, but displays the
text as "Part of the message signed" so unless you're really paying
attention, you'll miss it.

My thinking is this:

1) It's pretty easy to find signed content for people using GPG
2) It's pretty easy to append/embed signed content into a larger message

So the attack would be: create malicious content/email, embed/append a
valid message harvested from somewhere. Send to user. The user
verifies then reads the message, unless they are really paying
attention they probably won't notice that the content isn't signed
properly (e.g. have an email, ton of whitespace, then the signed
message). Personally I'm inclined to assign a CVE, enigmail for
example does mostly the right thing (makes a distinction between fully
signed and partially signed). I think GPG should too.
Thoughts/comments before I assign this?

A similar attack (related to PGP/MIME) has been under discussion on the
enigmail list last month.  see the thread starting at:

 https://lists.enigmail.net/pipermail/enigmail-users_enigmail.net/2013-March/000721.html

I think the enigmail issues are distinct from the gpg issues, and i
don't think they should be conflated into the same CVE.

In particular, i see the enigmail issues as (security-related) UI/UX
problems, but i see the gpg problems as (security-related)
API/programmatic-use problems.

By comparison with enigmail, thunderbird's native S/MIME verification
routines display no cryptographic indicators at all if only part of a
message is signed.  This means that S/MIME-signed messages sent through
common mailing list software which attaches a text/plain MIME footer
(like mailman) will not indicate that they are verifiable at all.

it's not a pretty set of tradeoffs. :/

        --dkg

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