oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Re: Summary of security bugs (now fixed) in user namespaces


From: Andy Lutomirski <luto () amacapital net>
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2013 10:34:23 -0700

On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 2:01 AM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com> wrote:
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On 04/15/2013 04:45 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Brian Martin
<brian () opensecurityfoundation org> wrote:

Andy;

: I previously reported these bugs privatley.  I'm summarizing
them for

: the historical record.  These bugs were never exploitable on a
: default-configured released kernel, but some 3.8 versions are :
vulnerable depending on configuration.

Do you know if these were patched, and therefore possibly
disclosed via the commits? With these details, it is difficult to
line them up to existing reports.

Bug 1 should be fixed in:

commit 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d Author: Eric W.
Biederman <ebiederm () xmission com> Date:   Fri Mar 15 01:45:51 2013
-0700

userns:  Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted

Can you confirm this has no CVE?

AFAIK it does not.


Bug 2 is should be fixed by these:

commit 90563b198e4c6674c63672fae1923da467215f45 Author: Eric W.
Biederman <ebiederm () xmission com> Date:   Fri Mar 22 03:10:15 2013
-0700

vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts

commit 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 Author: Eric W.
Biederman <ebiederm () xmission com> Date:   Fri Mar 22 04:08:05 2013
-0700

vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces

Can you confirm this has no CVE?

AFAIK it does not.



Bug 3 should be fixed in:

commit 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 Author: Eric W.
Biederman <ebiederm () xmission com> Date:   Fri Mar 15 01:03:33 2013
-0700

scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.

Can you confirm this has no CVE?


AFAIK it does not.

--Andy


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