oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE Request -- mcrypt: stack-based buffer overflow by encryption / decryption of overly long file names


From: "Steven M. Christey" <coley () rcf-smtp mitre org>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 22:12:04 -0500 (EST)


For my own clarification - where does this long file name come from? If it's only provided on the command line, then I don't see how this would be a vulnerability, since the person executing mcrypt would only be attacking themselves. (CVE-2012-4409 is still OK since one wouldn't expect code execution when decrypting the contents of a file.)

Thanks,
Steve


On Thu, 18 Oct 2012, Kurt Seifried wrote:

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On 10/18/2012 07:50 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,

  Attila Bogar reported a stack-based buffer overflow
in the way MCrypt, a crypt() package and crypt(1) command
replacement, used to encrypt / decrypt files with overly
long names (longer than 128 bytes). A remote attacker
could provide a specially-crafted file that, when processed
by the mcrypt too, would lead to mcrypt executable crash [*].

A different vulnerability than CVE-2012-4409:
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2012-4409

Note: Using Red Hat bugzilla record for CVE-2012-4409 since
particular Mitre record is not described yet.

References:
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=867790

Patch proposed by Attila:
[3] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=867790#c0

Reproducer:
To reproduce let mcrypt encrypt / decrypt file with name
longer ~128 bytes.

Could you allocate a CVE id for this?

Thank you && Regards, Jan.
--
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

[*] FORTIFY_SOURCE protection mechanism would mitigate this
deficiency to result into crash only. But on systems, without
FORTIFY_SOURCE protection being applied, the impact might be
higher.

P.S.: I am not sure about relation of this issue to the issue
      Raphael Geissert reported previously:
      [4] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/10/02/1

      so CC-in him too, he to clarify if [2] == [4], or if
      they are yet different issues. Raphael, please clarify.
      Thanks, Jan.


Please use CVE-2012-4527 for this issue.

- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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