oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Re: Yubiserver package ships with pre-filled identities


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 15:06:07 -0700

On 01/30/2012 02:32 PM, Nanakos Chrysostomos wrote:


Ok I'm not clear on what is going on here, is there a link to the bug
entry regarding this issue, or can someone clarify it?


Hi,
there is no bug entry yet.


1) are there default accounts shipped with the product that get
activated automatically during install? (it sounds like yes?)


Yes. The database is populated with an example/test account which is
activated during install.

Is this account documented/the impact documented?

2) can someone remotely/locally access these accounts? what are the
credentials for these accounts ("invalid keys"?), can an attacker access
them?


If someone programs or uses a software emulation for the yubikey can
have access to whatever the user of the application uses it for ( the
yubiserver). For example if someone uses Pam yubico module with the su
or sshd server to provide a two factor authentication scheme he should
suffer from this security issue if he hasn't deleted or deactivated the
test account. If someone by mistake installs yubiserver and doesn't use
him to validate his otp or hmac otp, he won't suffer from this security
issue. Someone can only suffer if he uses the server and hasn't deleted
or deactivated the test account which is shipped with the server.

3) what is the privilege level of the accounts?

That depends on how someone wants to use the server and the privilege
level that he wants to give to it's users through the validation of the
otp or hmac otp.

So it would basically be the same as any other standard account created
on the server?

Chris.


-- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)


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