oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled
From: Tim Brown <timb () openvas org>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2011 13:57:05 +0100
On Wednesday 07 Sep 2011 13:13:45 Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
Hello Josh, Steve, vendors, it was reported that the scanner module for the Open Vulnerability Assessment System (OpenVAS) used insecure way for creation of a temporary file, when generating OVAL system characteristics document from the knowledge base data available, with the ovaldi integrated tool enabled. A local attacker could use this flaw to conduct symlink attacks to overwrite arbitrary files on the system, accessible with the privileges of the user running the SLAD daemon and / or the ovaldi OVAL interpreter.
Whilst having a look at the code with regard to the recently reported f-d issue with OpenVAS, the handling of sc-out.xml in the very same function also looks insecure. It also doesn't appear to care about races either and I'm also curious as to whether you can control the contents at all (think attacks against the ovaldi XML parser). I would suggest that this code needs properly auditing or removing. Unfortunately the interaction with sc-out.xml happens before privileges are dropped so the malicious activitity occurs as the openvas-scanner user (normally root) rather than nobody as in the case of results.xml - The call to unlink referenced in the f-d email is actually a misnomer as it will actually only delete the file from /tmp and not whatever it may or may not have pointed to and the actual writing to the newly race created symlink actually happens within the ovaldi binary which is spawned as nobody AFAIK. Josh/oss-security folk, can I get a CVE for both bugs please. Will we need to split out the two race conditions as separate CVE? The OpenVAS advisory will cover both the originally reported nobody case as well as the root case referenced above. Tim -- Tim Brown <mailto:timb () openvas org> <http://www.openvas.org/>
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Current thread:
- CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Jan Lieskovsky (Sep 07)
- Re: CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Henri Doreau (Sep 07)
- Re: CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Tim Brown (Sep 07)
- Re: CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Josh Bressers (Sep 09)
- Re: [Openvas-devel] [oss-security] CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Jan-Oliver Wagner (Sep 09)
- Re: [Openvas-devel] [oss-security] CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Tim Brown (Sep 09)
- Re: CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled Josh Bressers (Sep 09)