Re: Vendor-sec hosting and future of closed lists

[Greg KH <greg () kroah com>]

First off, we are way off-topic from the original topic here, very sorry
about that.

On Thu, Mar 03, 2011 at 08:08:23PM -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> > I actually use that traffic to watch out for things that need to make
> > sure they go into the stable releases.  Those patches are then posted to
> > stable () kernel org when they are public, so you can watch that list if
> > you want.
>
> The difference is that distributions and the security community do not
> have access to the security () kernel org list.

That is the point of security@ list.  Many people on this very list
asked for this type of alias years ago, so don't go and say that now you
don't want it :)

> The goal here to is
> bridge that communication gap - perhaps what's really needed is
> allowing more representation on the existing list and clarifying and
> encouraging policies for when CC'ing security () kernel org is
> appropriate, especially in regards to on-the-fence issues.  If
> everyone were a bit more conscientious about e-mailing
> security () kernel org when appropriate and that list had better
> representation from people who can actually coordinate with various
> downstream vendors, that would be an improvement.

That is what stable@ can be used for, please feel free to do that there
today.

> > > > > I think security communication needs to be
> > > > > improved at the commit level (as opposed to the reporting), since
> > > > > maintainers are often much more knowledgeable and better able to
> > > > > understand security impact than the users who are often presenting
> > > > > issues.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think you understand the rate of change in the kernel and how
> > > > trying to do this for every commit is unfeasable and unworkable.  You do
> > > > know how fast it goes, right?
> > >
> > > Why is CC'ing a security list any more difficult than CC'ing stable?
> >
> > It's not, but if all you want to do is make sure the patch is applied to
> > the stable trees as you think it's a potential problem, just copy stable
> > instead.  That's what happens today.
>
> It's more about giving distributions the option of prioritizing
> security patches, and being more transparent about the potential risk
> introduced by certain issues.  As you've said, even picking security
> fixes out of the stable queue is a substantial amount of work, and
> this could be made easier with a bit more openness.

How can we be more open than we are today by showing you _all_ of the
patches that we are deeming as "fixes"?

You want people to somehow magically categorize patches, and that's not
going to happen because it's complicated and usually not known until
after the fact.  Way after the fact.

So again, take a look at stable () kernel org, it shows you all of these
patches and you can start classifying them if you wish to.

thanks,

greg k-h