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Re: Small exposure in ocfs2 fast symlinks.


From: Josh Bressers <bressers () redhat com>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:05:12 -0400 (EDT)

----- "Joel Becker" <Joel.Becker () oracle com> wrote:

Hey Everyone,
      We just discovered that ocfs2 could walk off the end of fast symlinks
      -- that is, symlinks that are stored directly in the inode block.
      ocfs2 terminates these with NUL characters, but a disk corruption or an
      attacker with direct access to the ocfs2 disk could overwrite the NUL.
      Following the symlink via the filesystem would walk off the end of the
      in-memory block buffer.  We're not sure how exploitable this is, but I
      figured I'd provide a heads-up.  The fix is in ocfs2's git tree and
      will be sent upstream tonight.  Erratas with the fix are being built.
      If someone thinks we should have a CVE, please provide me with the
      number.  Otherwise, just FYI.


Unless someone asks for an ID, I don't plan to give this one. I dare say if
an attacker can modify the disk directly, you probably have far bigger
worries here than following symlinks.

Thanks.

-- 
    JB


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