Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)

[Shane Ronan <shane () ronan-online com>]

I'm talking about PSTN hops, which like I previously said still accounts
for a VERY significant amount of calls.

And like I said, even if they do care now, how do they build the database
of allowed prefixes by customers, without potentially impacting the ability
for a customer to make a call? Remember, with email if an email doesn't go
through because of tightened restrictions, no one dies. With a voice call,
it may very well be the difference between life and death, they are not the
same.

Shane

On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 5:34 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:

> On 10/4/22 2:00 PM, sronan () ronan-online com wrote:
>
> I suppose but that also means they need to go back and figure out which
> prefixes to allow, since historically hasn’t been tracked.
>
>
> Which is the same thing as when email providers didn't care either.
> Getting them to care is key however you need to get that done.
>
>
> Also, how does the man in the middle since most calls don’t go from
> originating carrier to terminating carrier, know if the originator did
> their job?
>
> Why do the middle guys need to care? Only the originator and terminator
> have a stake in the spam problem. Of course I'm talking all SIP here, not
> with PSTN hops. Or is that what you're talking about?
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> On Oct 4, 2022, at 4:50 PM, Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> <mike () mtcc com>
> wrote:
>
> 
>
>
> On 10/4/22 1:40 PM, sronan () ronan-online com wrote:
>
> Except the pstn DB isn’t distributed like DNS is.
>
>
> Yes, I had forgot about "dip" in that sense. But an originating provider
> doesn't need to do a dip to know that the calling number routes to itself.
> I've been talking about the calling provider not the called provider all
> along.
>
> Mike
>
>
> On Oct 4, 2022, at 2:40 PM, Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> <mike () mtcc com>
> wrote:
>
> 
>
>
> On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
>
> Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't
> "free".
>
> Since every http request in the universe requires a "database dip" and
> they are probably a billion times more common, that doesn't seem like a
> very compelling concern.
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
>
> > On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
> >
> > I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone
> > policed their customers, this wouldn't be a problem. Since some don't,
> > something else needed to be tried.
> >
> >
> > Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to use
> > what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the ingress provider
> > to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof whatever
> > email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.
> >
> >
> > Mike
> >
> >
> > -----
> > Mike Hammett
> > Intelligent Computing Solutions
> > http://www.ics-il.com
> >
> > Midwest-IX
> > http://www.midwest-ix.com
> >
> > ------------------------------
> > *From: *"Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com> <shane () ronan-online com>
> > *To: *"Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> <mike () mtcc com>
> > *Cc: *nanog () nanog org
> > *Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
> > *Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
> >
> > The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which
> > 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with, because it's entirely
> > dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume
> > that my peer or my peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right
> > thing.
> >
> > I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not allowed, so
> > there has to be some mechanism to mark that a prefix should be allowed,
> > which is what Shaken/Stir does.
> >
> > Shane
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> >
> > > The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The
> > > problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You
> > > don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes
> > > customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission
> > > authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no
> > > incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP
> > > signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All it needed
> > > was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was always
> > > jurisdiction with the FCC.
> > >
> > > Mike
> > >
> > > On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> > > > We're talking about blocking other carriers.
> > > >
> > > > On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >      On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> > > >      > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic
> > > otherwise.
> > > >      Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
> > > >
> > > >      Mike
> > > >
> > > >      >
> > > >      > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas"
> > > <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband.com () nanog org on behalf of
> > > mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > > >      >
> > > >      >
> > > >      >      On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
> > > >      >      > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist
> > > voice
> > > >      >      > providers for flouting robocall rules
> > > >      >      >
> > > >      >      >
> > > https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
> > > >      >      >
> > > >      >      > [...]
> > > >      >      > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its
> > > obligations under
> > > >      >      > the law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone
> > > networks. Fines
> > > >      >      > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel
> > > said in a
> > > >      >      > statement accompanying the announcement. “Providers that
> > > don’t follow
> > > >      >      > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers will now
> > > face swift
> > > >      >      > consequences.”
> > > >      >      >
> > > >      >      > It’s the first such enforcement action by the agency to
> > > reduce the
> > > >      >      > growing problem of robocalls since call ID verification
> > > protocols
> > > >      >      > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect this
> > > summer.
> > > >      >      > [...]
> > > >      >
> > > >      >      Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this?
> > > >      >
> > > >      >      Mike
> > > >      >