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Re: 2749 routes AT RISK - Re: TIMELY/IMPORTANT - Approximately 40 hours until potentially significant routing changes (re: Retirement of ARIN Non-Authenticated IRR scheduled for 4 April 2022)


From: Wes George <wesgeorge () puck nether net>
Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 17:57:50 -0400


On 4/4/2022 11:56 AM, Job Snijders via NANOG wrote:
One might argue "well, folks had more than a year to move their
objects!", but on the other hand, it is entirely possible not all the
right people were reached, or in cases where affected parties did
receive a communication from ARIN, they perhaps were unable to
understand the message.

Delurking to underscore this.

On 2/16/2022 4:33 PM, John Curran via NANOG wrote:
We also notified by email Points of Contact (POCs) of organizations who
have objects in the ARIN-NONAUTH database of the retirement date and
offered them our assistance with the
  transition.

I am an ARIN admin and tech POC for one of the affected ASNs/sets of prefixes across 2 OrgIDs. I looked back at the messages I've received that mention NONAUTH or Non-Authenticated. The only thing I've gotten is the message originally sent via ARIN-Announce that John forwarded, plus similar reminders.

I do not see any OrgID-specific communication about this.

No message saying "you are receiving this notification because you have the following items that are in this thing we're retiring and nowhere else" or "this may cause problems with your routes being propagated on the internet" or some similar warning, or even something in the generic note about how one should check to confirm whether they are affected. I didn't realize until looking at the list Job provided that this was something that affected me specifically, so the "don't care bits" were set on the generic form letters I got from ARIN.

Nowhere does it say clearly what action should be taken in response other than to contact ARIN with questions. It's getting me to generate ROAs for my prefixes, so good job there, but ARIN failed in its efforts to communicate what was happening in terms of the actual effects in order to make an appropriate call to action for those who were either like me, thinking we weren't affected, or are unfamiliar with how this interacts with the rest of the Internet's routing infrastructure.

I'm extremely grateful to Job and Kenneth for stepping in to address ARIN's failure here before it ruined a lot of people's weeks.

Wes George


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