nanog mailing list archives

Re: DOD prefixes and AS8003 / GRSCORP


From: Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 20:17:47 +0000

Like any other announcement, except DOD and what looks suspiciously like a shell corporation. Either the DOD doesn’t 
know about it (and I’ve called DISA and opened a ticket), which is scary, or the DOD is creating a private shell 
corporation to move all it’s IP space out of government purview, which sounds even more scary. 

-mel via cell

On Mar 15, 2021, at 1:11 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com> wrote:

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 4:04 PM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:

As I said, “DOD Network Information Center”:

Source Registry ARIN Kind Org Full Name DoD Network Information Center Handle DNIC Address 3990 E. Broad Street 
Columbus OH 43218 United States Roles Registrant Last Changed Wed, 17 Aug 2011 14:45:37 GMT (Wed Aug 17 2011 local 
time)  Self https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/DNIC Alternate https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/DNIC Port 43 Whois 
whois.arin.net
-mel

NetRange:       7.0.0.0 - 7.255.255.255
CIDR:           7.0.0.0/8
NetName:        DISANET7
NetHandle:      NET-7-0-0-0-1
Parent:          ()
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:
Organization:   DoD Network Information Center (DNIC)
RegDate:        1997-11-24
Updated:        2006-04-28
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/7.0.0.0



OrgName:        DoD Network Information Center
OrgId:          DNIC
Address:        3990 E. Broad Street
City:           Columbus
StateProv:      OH


it seems to still say that...
This looks like any other sort of: "have my ISP announce my prefixes
because I can't bgp" (or whatever other reason)



On Mar 15, 2021, at 1:01 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com> wrote:

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:38 PM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:


I also note that this reassignment isn’t reflected in ARIN’s Whois database.


where is it reflected?


-mel


On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:


 Owen,


I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) 
are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, 
had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”.


I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well 
over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind 
this huge transfer of wealth.



is it possible that the DoD:
1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA)
2) asked AS8003 to announce these prefixes (in certain sized blocks, maybe)

under normal actions that arin does all the time for people?
If these were /24's and not parts/whole of /8's would anyone have noticed?

it's entirely possible that 8003 is just a holding tank for the
prefixes while DoD/etc find a method to xfer the space to those that
may be willing to pay pesos per ip, right?

Don’t you?


-mel beckman


On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog () nanog org> wrote:


 According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in 
Delaware on September 8, 2020.

Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020

It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there.


I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about.


Owen


On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <aveline () misaka io> wrote:


Hi John,


My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its 
existence.


When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and 
we had to pay the state to order it.


However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case.


Regards,

Siyuan


On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran () arin net> wrote:


On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline () misaka io> wrote:



Hi Folks,


Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s)  are now announced 
under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago.


It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?



Siyuan -


If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification 
with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0


As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the 
potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address 
space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises 
when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some 
destinations."


Thanks!

/John


John Curran

President and CEO

American Registry for Internet Numbers




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