nanog mailing list archives
Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990
From: Mark Tinka <mark.tinka () seacom com>
Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2020 22:40:19 +0200
On 1/Aug/20 21:20, Owen DeLong wrote:
IP Prefix level filtering at the customer edge is not that hard, no matter how large of a transit provider you are. Customer edge filtration by Telia in this case would have prevented this problem from spreading beyond the misconfigured ASN.
+1. There's simply no excuse - even if 100% of your eBGP sessions may be customers :-). Mark.
Current thread:
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990, (continued)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Sabri Berisha (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Owen DeLong (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Nick Hilliard (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Sabri Berisha (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Nick Hilliard (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Owen DeLong (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Sabri Berisha (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Owen DeLong (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 01)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 02)
- RE: BGP route hijack by AS10990 adamv0025 (Aug 03)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Alex Band (Aug 03)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 03)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Job Snijders (Aug 03)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Baldur Norddahl (Aug 03)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Aug 03)