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Re: deploying RPKI based Origin Validation


From: Grant Taylor via NANOG <nanog () nanog org>
Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 09:18:07 -0600

On 07/13/2018 06:53 AM, Mark Tinka wrote:
But yes, the majority of the issue was with routes learned from peers
and transit. That, though, still leaves the problem where you end up
providing a partial routing table to your customers, while your
competitors in the same market aren't.

Ouch.

Most customers that aren't keen on IPv6 or DNSSEC treat RPKI the same way - as a nuisance.

I can see that.  :-(

So trying to speak sense into them would be a more treacherous road to take than just turning it off until we get wider support within the BGP operational community.

Please forgive the n00b question: But isn't that where carrying the prefixes through your network and conditionally advertising them to customers comes into play?

Or does that run into complications where you must also have the prefixes which don't validate routed in your core?

The reading I did on RPKI / OV yesterday made me think that it is possible to have validated routes preferred over unknown routes which are preferred over invalid routes. So I'd think that you could still have the routes through your core but conditionally advertise the prefixes to customers based on their desires.

I would appreciate it if someone would be kind enough to explain what I'm misunderstanding. Or better, point me to some better documentation to read myself.

Thank you from the peanut gallery.



--
Grant. . . .
unix || die

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