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BCP38 deployment [ was Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey ]
From: Hugo Slabbert <hugo () slabnet com>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:19:31 -0700
On Sun 2016-Sep-25 15:59:15 -0700, Stephen Satchell <list () satchell net> wrote:
On 09/25/2016 07:32 AM, Jay R. Ashworth wrote:From: "Jay Farrell via NANOG" <nanog () nanog org>And of course Brian Krebs has a thing or two to say, not the least is which to push for BCP38 (good luck with that, right?). https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/the-democratization-of-censorship/Well, given how few contributions we've gotten at bcp38.info in the last, what, 4 years, yeah, I guess so...Yeah, right. I looked at BCP38.info, and there is very little concrete information. I've been slogging through the two RFCs, 2827 and 3794, and find it tough sledding to extract the nuggets to put into my firewall and routing table. One of the more interesting new additions to my systems is this, to the routing tables:
### snip ###
In short, I have yet to see a "cookbook" for BGP38 filtering, for ANY filtering system -- BSD, Linux, Cisco.
I am guilty of not yet contributing cookbook-type info to BCP38.info, but: Cisco:http://www.bcp38.info/index.php/HOWTO:Cisco points at http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/unicast-reverse-path-forwarding.html
Juniper: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos14.2/topics/usage-guidelines/interfaces-configuring-unicast-rpf.html http://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos15.1/topics/topic-map/unicast-rpf.html Linux: From /etc/sysctl.conf:# Uncomment the next two lines to enable Spoof protection (reverse-path # filter)
# Turn on Source Address Verification in all interfaces to # prevent some spoofing attacks net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1 net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1Unfortunately, the net.ipv6 equivalents for those do not yet seem to be a thing on Linux.
For a belt-and-suspenders approach:If you're running an edge network and not transiting traffic for any other AS, consider using your assigned aggregates prefix lists to filter on egress on your edge for anything not sourced from those aggregates.
I'm curious as to the deployment scope and experiences of various sizes of networks in deploying the following:
1. Strict uRPF on customer-facing ports on edge networks2. Source address filtering on upstream edge egress based on assigned aggregates
3. Destination address filtering on upstream edge ingress based on assigned aggregates
-- Hugo Slabbert | email, xmpp/jabber: hugo () slabnet com pgp key: B178313E | also on Signal
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- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey, (continued)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Niels Bakker (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Christopher Morrow (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Brett Watson (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Justin Paine via NANOG (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Jared Mauch (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Jay Farrell via NANOG (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Jay R. Ashworth (Sep 24)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Jay Farrell via NANOG (Sep 25)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Jay R. Ashworth (Sep 25)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Stephen Satchell (Sep 25)
- BCP38 deployment [ was Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey ] Hugo Slabbert (Sep 25)
- Re: BCP38 deployment [ was Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey ] Valdis . Kletnieks (Sep 26)
- Re: BCP38 deployment [ was Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey ] Vincent Bernat (Sep 26)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Mark Milhollan (Sep 26)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Royce Williams (Sep 26)
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- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey John Kristoff (Sep 26)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Ca By (Sep 25)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Mike Hammett (Sep 25)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Jay R. Ashworth (Sep 25)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Ca By (Sep 25)
- Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey Mike Hammett (Sep 25)