nanog mailing list archives
Re: huawei
From: Jimmy Hess <mysidia () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 20:58:42 -0500
On 6/13/13, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick () ianai net> wrote:
It should be trivial to prove to yourself the box is, or is not, doing something evil if you actually try.
What if it's not doing anything evil 99% of the time... after all 90%+ of traffic may be of no interest to a potential adversary, but there is a backdoor mechanism that allows "targetted evilness" to be enabled? Sniffing on a targetted IP address can be disguised as "legitimate" return traffic, to a connection actually initiated from the "backdoor data interaction point" to some other web server, creating a ruse.. A low-bandwidth fabricated return flow on top of the legitimate return flow once every few months, or every few days is extremely likely to go unnoticed, on any network that has a significantly large amount of normal production traffic.
-- TTFN, patrick
-- -JH
Current thread:
- Re: huawei, (continued)
- Re: huawei Warren Bailey (Jun 16)
- Re: huawei Scott Helms (Jun 18)
- Re: huawei Eugen Leitl (Jun 15)
- Re: huawei Scott Helms (Jun 15)
- Re: huawei Jimmy Hess (Jun 15)
- Re: huawei Scott Helms (Jun 15)
- Re: huawei Phil Fagan (Jun 13)
- Re: huawei Nick Hilliard (Jun 13)
- Re: huawei Scott Helms (Jun 13)
- Re: huawei Jimmy Hess (Jun 13)
- Re: huawei Mark Seiden (Jun 13)