nanog mailing list archives
Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard
From: Ray Soucy <rps () maine edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2011 08:46:22 -0500
I think of RA Guard as a Layer-2 stability feature, rather than a security feature. You're correct that it is unable to deal with RA crafted in a fragmented packet on the majority (if not all) of implementations. The issue of rogue RA exists on every network, regardless of whether or not the IT group has deployed IPv6 or is aware of the IPv6 traffic on that network. Windows ICS is the most common "accidental" cause of rogue RA on a LAN. On Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 10:35 PM, Daniel Espejel <daniel.unam.ipv6 () gmail com> wrote:
So,still assuming the fact that attackers will use the same "traditional ipv4" methods to alter the correct functioning over a network?...Well, maybe. Toda's IPv6 expertise for some network andmins and security experts is minimal. So most trainning and understanding before implementing its a good idea. For example, the RA-Guard method has a significant vulnerability: It's not designed to identify a "complex" IPv6-many extension headers formed packet (F. Gont - 6Networks). Some other security oriented mechanisms may fail because of the low IPv6 compliance. Regards. -- Daniel Espejel Pérez Técnico Académico D.G.T.I.C. - U.N.A.M. GT-IPv6 CLARA / GT-IPv6 U.N.A.M.
-- Ray Soucy Epic Communications Specialist Phone: +1 (207) 561-3526 Networkmaine, a Unit of the University of Maine System http://www.networkmaine.net/
Current thread:
- Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard excelsio (Dec 04)
- Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard Christopher Morrow (Dec 04)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard Daniel Espejel (Dec 05)
- Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard Ray Soucy (Dec 06)
- Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard Daniel Espejel (Dec 06)
- Re: HP IPv6 RA Guard Ray Soucy (Dec 06)