nanog mailing list archives

Re: D/DoS mitigation hardware/software needed.


From: Bill Blackford <bill () billblackford com>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2010 20:09:40 -0800

A lot of this has to do with scaling the environment. I've had plenty of
asa's and even netscreens fall over from state-table and session
limitations. I've also seen a hosts fill up the connection table prior to a
firewall being affected. I'm not familiar with the specs and anyone can
chime in, but the newer variety of SRX's, I believe implement more in
hardware as line-rate routers do. A layered approach is useful as well. If
the source can be identified via netflow and null routed before it gets to
the firewall and content layer, then all the better. This is much more
tricky with DDOS so having robust firewall that can eat traffic is helpful.

My 3 cents

-b

On Mon, Jan 4, 2010 at 7:35 PM, Christopher Morrow
<morrowc.lists () gmail com>wrote:

On Mon, Jan 4, 2010 at 9:18 PM, jim deleskie <deleskie () gmail com> wrote:
What Roland said, I've seen people do this, no rules in place, still
was able to kill the box (firewall) with a single CPU server.

not to pile on, but... +1 to roland here as well. I've seen more than
enough folks put in a 'firewall' in front of their 'server' (say a
mail server) and then watch that die long before the rest of the
system did.

Now, if you have equipment capable today of doing a few million
session creates/second and you feel comfortable that you can keep
track of how attacks grow vs your capacity stays the same and move
ahead of the curve well enough, then... by all means do as you want :)

There's a cost analysis which Roland sidestepped here as well,
state-tracking at the rates required is expensive, as compared to
relatively simple acls in hardware with no state on the upstream
router.

Spend where it matters, and make sure you understand where the failure
points are that you place into your network.

-chris

-jim

On Mon, Jan 4, 2010 at 10:04 PM, Dobbins, Roland <rdobbins () arbor net>
wrote:

On Jan 5, 2010, at 4:25 AM, Jeffrey Lyon wrote:

Use a robust firewall such as a Netscreen in front of your mitigation
tool.

Absolutely not - the firewall will fall over due to state-table
exhaustion before the mitigation system will.  Firewalls (which have no
place in front of servers in the first place), load-balancers, and any other
stateful devices should be southbound of the mitigation system.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins () arbor net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>

   Injustice is relatively easy to bear; what stings is justice.

                       -- H.L. Mencken











-- 
Bill Blackford
Network Engineer


Current thread: