nanog mailing list archives

Re: Consumer Grade - IPV6 Enabled Router Firewalls.


From: Steven Bellovin <smb () cs columbia edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2009 00:10:58 -0500


On Dec 14, 2009, at 11:47 PM, Joel Jaeggli wrote:



Owen DeLong wrote:
UPnP is a bad idea that (fortunately) doesn't apply to IPv6 anyway.

You don't need UPnP if you'r not doing NAT.

wishful thinking.

you're likely to still have a staeful firewall and in the consumer space
someone is likely to want to punch holes in it.

Yes, SI will still be needed.  However, UPnP is, at it's heart a way to
allow
arbitrary unauthenticated applications the power to amend your security
policy to their will.  Can you possibly explain any way in which such a
thing is at all superior to no firewall at all?

I'm a consumer, I want to buy something, take it home, turn it on and
have it work. I don't have an IT department. How the manufacturers solve
that is their problem.

As a consumer my preferences for a security posture to the extent that I
have one are:

don't hose me

don't make my life any more complicated than necessary

I would argue that a firewall that can be reconfigured by any applet a user
clicks on (whether they know it or not) is actually less useful than no
firewall because it creates the illusion in the users mind that there is a
firewall protecting them.

Stable outgoing connections for p2p apps, messaging, gaming platforms
and foo website with java script based rpc mechanisms have similar
properties. I don't sleep soundly at night becasuse the $49 buffalo
router I bought off an endcap at frys uses iptables, I sleep soundly
because I don't care.

Precisely.  And if you want to get picky, remember that "availability" is part
of the standard definition of security.  A firewall that doesn't let me play
Chocolate-Sucking Zombie Monsters is an attack on the availability of that
gmae, albeit from the purest of motives.

No, I'm not saying that this is good.  I am saying that in the real world, it
*will* happen.


                --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb







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