nanog mailing list archives
Re: anycast and ddos
From: "Christopher L. Morrow" <christopher.morrow () mci com>
Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 01:38:18 +0000 (GMT)
On Fri, 6 May 2005, Randy Bush wrote:
it seems that anycasting was quite insufficient to protect netsol's service from being severely damaged (udp dead, tcp worked) for a considerable length of time by a ddos [0] last week [1]. it would be very helpful to other folk concerned with service deployment to understand how the service in question was/is anycast, and what might be done differently to mitigate exposure of similar services.
was the service in question anycast'ed? I got the impression that the worldnic servers were all NON-anycast... I only see the /21 covering these servers through 10515 (which is verisign as I recall?) Judging by latency I even think they are in the northern virginia area... I also noted: worldnic.com. 86400 IN NS ns1.netsol.com. worldnic.com. 86400 IN NS ns2.netsol.com. worldnic.com. 86400 IN NS ns3.netsol.com. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ns1.netsol.com. 86400 IN A 216.168.229.228 ns2.netsol.com. 86400 IN A 216.168.229.229 ns3.netsol.com. 86400 IN A 216.168.229.229 why have 3 records and 2 ips? odd. You'd think they would have more ips in that /21 or other /24's to allocate from, just in case they had to jettison 1 address which was getting pounded :( (not that these were getting attacked per-say, but still)
[0] - as it seems that the ddos sources were ip address spoofed (which is why the service still worked for tcp), i owe paul an apology for downplaying the immediacy of the need for source address filtering.
It's also not clear that the sources were spoofed, if as Patrick says they put in a riverhead(s) (which isn't too far fetched) the normal mode for 'protection' of DNS is to: 1) truncate 2) rate-limit - and cache (I think it caches atleast, I know it will go into proxy mode and rate-limit) truncate forces TCP which allows RHG to verify the source address is really asking to chat, rate-limit function keeps 'bad actors' from beatting the hell out of the protected resource. So, without more info from NetSol (seems not to be forthcoming?) about the mix of attack traffic (which the RHG will provide) it's hard to state definitively that the attack was 'mostly spoofed' :(
Current thread:
- anycast and ddos Randy Bush (May 06)
- Re: anycast and ddos Patrick W. Gilmore (May 06)
- Re: anycast and ddos Christopher L. Morrow (May 06)
- Re: anycast and ddos Randy Bush (May 07)
- Re: anycast and ddos Randy Bush (May 07)
- Re: anycast and ddos Christopher L. Morrow (May 07)
- NetSol disaster (was Re: anycast and ddos) Randy Bush (May 07)
- Re: anycast and ddos Randy Bush (May 07)
- Message not available
- Re: anycast and ddos Hank Nussbacher (May 08)
- Re: anycast and ddos Rodney Joffe (May 08)
- Re: anycast and ddos Hank Nussbacher (May 08)
- Re: anycast and ddos Hank Nussbacher (May 08)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: anycast and ddos Fergie (Paul Ferguson) (May 06)
- Re: anycast and ddos Kim Onnel (May 06)
- Re: anycast and ddos Christopher L. Morrow (May 06)
- Re: anycast and ddos Kim Onnel (May 06)