nanog mailing list archives

Re: uRPF-based Blackhole Routing System Overview


From: Greg Maxwell <gmaxwell () martin fl us>
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2003 14:29:00 -0500 (EST)


On Fri, 7 Nov 2003, Robert A. Hayden wrote:

[snip]
One final note.  This system is pretty useless for modem pools, VPN
concentrators, and many DHCP implementations.  The dynamic IP nature of
these setups means you will just kill legitimate traffic next time someone
gets the IP.  You can attempt to correlate your detection with the time
they were handed out, of course, in the hopes you find them.

Another approach to address this type of problem is the source spoofing
preventing dynamic-acls support that some vendors have been adding to
their products. I don't know if it's in anyone's production code-trains
yet.

The basic idea is that your switch snoops DHCP traffic to the port and
generates an ACL based on the address assigned to the client. Removing a
host is as simple as configuring your DHCP server to ignore it's requests
and perhaps sending a crafty packet (custom written DECLINE) to burp the
existing ACL out of the switch.

Vendor F calls this feature "Source IP Port Security", I'm not sure what
vendor C calls it.

Since this is a layer 2 feature you can configure it far out on the edge
and not just at the router.



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