nanog mailing list archives

RE: dsl providers that will route /24


From: "David Schwartz" <davids () webmaster com>
Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2001 01:06:06 -0800



        I don't know if you're just not reading what I'm writing or if we're
speaking different languages or what. We're totally talking past each other.

        Here's one misunderstanding. I wrote:

... the problem is there's no good way to tell a spoofed
packet from an unspoofed packet.

        You wrote:

Um, David... Do you actually READ the list or do you just randomly
reply?  Here's a clue for you.

1) Require that your customers notify you of any source addresses that
they'll be using *PRIOR* to allowing them through.  Tunneling is MUCH
more rare than spoofing.

2) Require that your customers (BGP speakers) register their networks in
RADB or whichever database you choose.  (Don't worry.  From the sounds of
it, NONE of us want your customers...the spoofing b@$tard$...and as such,
we're not really interested in who they are beyond filtering them.)

        Now, I think you considered what I quoted from you above as replying to
what I quoted from me above. However, neither of the two things you stated
makes it any easier for me to tell if a packet is spoofed or not.

        The statement of mine that you were attempting to reply to was, "there's no
good way to tell a spoofed packet from an unspoofed packet". And I've
already made it clear that by "spoofed", I mean a packet that didn't
originate on a machine administered by someone authorized to use that IP
address on the public Internet.

        I get a packet with the origin IP address '206.4.2.1'. How do I tell
whether the packet is spoofed or whether it actually originated at the
machine authorized to use the IP address '206.4.2.1'? Perhaps a dialup
machine on my customer's LAN was assigned that IP address from another
provider.

        Regardless of whether I filter or not, the fact remains that a filter can't
tell a spoofed packet from an unspoofed packet.

        Here's another misunderstanding:

     Again, no. A unicast UDP flood can do just as much damage. So
filters do not reduce the damage.

How's that?  The last time I checked, my "are you a customer" filters
worked against both TCP and UDP.

        Obviously, I was talking about an unspoofed flood. I mention UDP because
most unspoofed floods (at least, that I've seen) are UDP. It's the easiest
flood to launch if you haven't root compromised a box.

        This is rapidly degenerating from a discussion of network operations into a
series of personal attacks.

        DS





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