nanog mailing list archives
Re: Bellovin sez...
From: Eric Sobocinski <sobo () merit edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 1998 14:31:00 -0500
They could, that is, unless everyone to whom the hacker attached was doing ingress BGP filtering for all peers/downstreams. I'm sure my Merit RA comrades would be glad to jump in with a plug that IRR and route servers could help facilitate this, as would the varied groups that are working on authenticating network allocations of incoming routes. But that of course was your point. :-) --eric <ducking in case he started a religious war> On Fri, 20 Feb 1998 at 09:29 PST, Michael Dillon <michael () memra com> wrote:
Here's a quote from this story http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19980220S0001 Both Bellovin and his AT&T colleague Matt Blaze cited the vulnerability of the Net's decentralized routing system, .... This routing information has been accidentally corrupted several times, they said, resulting in massive traffic flows being rerouted through single slow machines or blocked altogether. They said a hacker could also cause this kind of corruption. -- Michael Dillon - Internet & ISP Consulting http://www.memra.com - E-mail: michael () memra com
Current thread:
- Bellovin sez... Michael Dillon (Feb 20)
- Re: Bellovin sez... Friskies (Feb 20)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: Bellovin sez... Eric Sobocinski (Feb 20)
- Re: Bellovin sez... Abha Ahuja (Feb 20)
- Message not available
- Re: Bellovin sez... Ran Atkinson (Feb 20)
- Re: Bellovin sez... Sean M. Doran (Feb 20)
- Re: Bellovin sez... Sean Donelan (Feb 22)
- Re: Bellovin sez... William S. Duncanson (Feb 23)