nanog mailing list archives

Re: New Denial of Service Attack ...


From: postel () ISI EDU
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 1996 22:52:46 -0700


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Subject: Re: FW: Latest attacks....
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 08:39:02 +0100
From: Jon Crowcroft <J.Crowcroft () cs ucl ac uk>


problem solved:

this just in on your trusty end2end research group's list (sorry, i
know some of you may already read it)

this guy is usually technically excellent, so i think we can trust
that this solution is valid, will propagate, and is deployable for
server sites that worry (you only need kernel reconfig rights for unix
to add this - NT and MAC servers may have a tad more of a problem:-).

cheers
jon
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Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 14:32:14 -0600
From: vjs () mica denver sgi com (Vernon Schryver)
Subject: SYN bombing defense

As reported here, in article <vxjiv9hkmcb.fsf_-_ () dominator eecs harvard edu>
in comp.protocols.tcp-ip, Robert Morris  <rtm () dominator eecs harvard edu> wrote:

Perhaps TCP's listen queue should use random early drop (RED), a
technique used by routers to prevent any one source from monopolizing
a queue. See http://www-nrg.ee.lbl.gov/floyd/abstracts.html#FJ93 or
rfc1254.
...

I've just hacked IRIX 6.3 to do random-drop when sonewconn() in
tcp_input.c fails.  It works great!  An IP22 receiving 1200 bogus
SYN's per second directed to port 23 continues to answer requests
for new telnet as if nothing is happening.

I don't think that random <<Early>> drop is necessary or desirable.
It is not as if we're trying to drop packets early to trigger
slow start in the sources.

As I figure it, as long as the length of the queue is longer than RTT
of the real telnet client times the rate of bogus SYNs, the real
clients have an excellent probability of getting through on their
first attempt.  For example, at 1200 bogus SYNs/sec and the IRIX 6.3
telnet listen queue of 383, there should be no trouble with peers
with RTT up to about 300 milliseconds.  I've tested with a telnet
client 250 milliseconds away while simultaneously bombing the machine
from nearby with ~1200 SYNs/sec, and see no telnet TCP retransmissions.


Vernon Schryver,  vjs () sgi com

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