REVIEW: "Practical Cryptography", Bruce Schneier/Niels Ferguson

[InfoSec News <isn () c4i org>]

Forwarded from: "Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah" <rslade () sprint ca>

BKPRCCRP.RVW   20030918

"Practical Cryptography", Bruce Schneier/Niels Ferguson, 2003,
0-471-22357-3, U$50.00/C$76.95/UK#34.95
%A   Bruce Schneier schneier () counterpane com
%A   Niels Ferguson niels () macfergus com
%C   5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON   M9B 6H8
%D   2003
%G   0-471-22357-3
%I   John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
%O   U$50.00/C$76.95/UK#34.95 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471223573/robsladesinterne
  http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471223573/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471223573/robsladesin03-20
%P   410 p.
%T   "Practical Cryptography"

The preface points out that cryptography has done more harm than good
in terms of securing information systems, not because cryptography
fails in and of itself, but, rather, due to the improper use or
implementation of the technology.  This book is intended to provide
concrete advice to those designing and implementing cryptographic
systems.  As such, it is not the usual introduction to cryptography,
and is aimed at a fairly limited group.

Chapter one asserts that we should be engineering for security, rather
than speed or bells and whistles.  Security is only as strong as the
weakest link, we are told in chapter two, and (following from the idea
of defence in depth) we need to have engineering in depth (and
probably breadth, as well).  The issues are important, but there is
some lack of clarity to the organization and flow of the text and
arguments: the reader may start to wonder what the essence of the
message is.  (I see that I should have trademarked "professional
paranoia" when I started using it years ago, but it is nice to note
that the point is being taken.)  Chapter three is a rather unusual
"Introduction to Cryptography" (and the mathematical format of the
text doesn't make it easier for the math-phobic to concentrate on the
meaning), but focussing on the applications and problems, the
cryptanalytic attacks, and repeating the injunctions against
complexity and the sacrifice of security for performance is a
reasonable position.

Having come this far, it is interesting to note that we are only
starting part one, reviewing message security.  Chapter four compares
and reviews various existing block ciphers.  The modes, and attacks
against specific modes, of block algorithms are described in chapter
five.  (This material appears to be what would, in a more traditional
book, be the introduction to cryptography.)  Hash functions are
explained, compared, and assessed in chapter six, while seven extends
the concept to message authentication codes, which ensure not only
detection of accidental alteration, but are also resistant to outsider
modification attacks on the data or transmission.  We therefore have
the basic tools that we need to consider a channel that is secure from
eavesdropping and manipulation by anyone not party to the
communications, in chapter eight.  Implementation, and the engineering
or software development considerations, are examined in chapter nine.

Part two deals with key negotiation, partly by introducing the concept
of asymmetric (more commonly, if less accurately, referred to as
"public key") cryptography, the major strength of which involves the
handling of keys.  Chapter ten raises the issue of randomness, which
is vital in the choice of keys, and also talks about the components of
the Fortuna system for generating pseudo-random numbers.  Prime
numbers are explained in chapter eleven, due to their importance in
asymmetric cryptography.  The venerable Diffie-Hellman algorithm is
reviewed, along with the math that makes it work, in chapter twelve. 
(If you want to follow the material all the way, you'll have to be
good at mathematics, but the discussion, while interesting, is not
vital to the use of the system.)  A similar job is done on RSA in
chapter thirteen.  Chapter fourteen is entitled an "Introduction to
Cryptographic Protocols" but really talks about trust, risk, and more
requirements for the secure channel.  The high level design of a key
negotiation protocol is incrementally developed in chapter fifteen. 
Implementation issues specific to asymmetric systems are reviewed in
chapter sixteen.

Part three looks at key management, and various approaches to the
problem.  Chapter seventeen discusses the use, and risks of using,
clocks and time in cryptosystems.  The idea of the key server is
illustrated by Kerberos in chapter eighteen, but almost no detail is
included.  A quick introduction to PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) is
given in chapter nineteen, followed by a philosophical review of other
considerations in twenty, and additional practical concerns in twenty
one.  (While the division is not unreasonable, these three could,
without seriously distorting the book, have been one big chapter.) 
Storing secrets, important for key and password reliability, is
contemplated in chapter twenty two.

Part four contains miscellaneous topics, including the futility of
standards (twenty three), the questionable utility of patents (twenty
four), and the need for involving real experts (twenty five).

As noted, this book is not simply another introduction to
cryptography.  The content is for those involved in the guts of a
cryptosystem, and the material provides significant guidance for the
concerns of people in that position.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 2003   BKPRCCRP.RVW   20030918


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